India is not ready to accept any additions or alterations in the signed document because that will amount to opening up all its nuclear power and research plants for intrusive inspections and a cap on all fissile material production. Therefore, there are more chances of the nuclear deal going up in smoke rather than being enforced in its original form that was expected to bring benefits to the two countries, one the world’s largest democracy and the other the oldest one. Should it flounder, it is certain to see, as the foreign secretary said, a break on the gathering momentum in Indo-US relations. The bilateral relations might not revert to the Cold War days of hostility and deep suspicion because the two countries have now strong business and commercial ties that will not allow things to fall over the cliff.

In keeping with the tradition of Indian politics, there will be a big outcry domestically with outfits like the BJP and the Samajwadi Party pointing fingers at 10 Janpath (something they do all the time). Other critics of the deal in India would probably be relieved that India was saved from ‘surrendering’ its nuclear programme before the US. Outside the political circles, those responsible for projecting the Indian point of view abroad—the ministry of external affairs and the US lobbyists or PR firms hired at great cost to the exchequer—may become targets within the country for their failure to hard sell the Indian view to ‘save’ the deal. Many might like to know the truth behind the so-called power and influence of the Indian diaspora in the US or, more importantly, the much-hyped India Caucus, many of whose members openly oppose the nuclear deal, which they say will encourage nuclear proliferation. What role can one expect from an ‘Indian Caucus’ when some of its members are also part of the Pakistan Caucus—one of them its co-chair.

Lobbies and PR firms play an important role in American politics. The US law grants them sanctity and respectability, but to the traditional Indian eyes their role would appear to be rather dubious; more like a broker who greases palms to get deals through. Bribes may not be part of this American game but it is no secret that in the US these lobbyists go to great lengths to win support from influential members of Congressional committees and other important officials. While there may be some reluctance to talk about it openly, it appears that cash flow in the shape of donations to party funds has a way of shaping the opinions of recalcitrant members and officials on important policy matters in the US.

It is to be presumed that once a foreign government has hired—at astronomical fees—a lobbyists or a PR firm in the US it is not required to pay extra for services rendered while trying to influence the law makers. The government of India is believed to have hired two lobbying firms one of which is headed by Robert Blackwill, a former US ambassador to Delhi, to promote Indian interests in the US. Blackwill is known as a close friend of Bush and that makes him an important figure on the Capitol Hill. During his brief but somewhat controversial tenure in India he had also projected himself as a genuine friend of India. Even as knives are taken out in India, the government as well as the critics of the nuclear deal need to ponder over a likely long-term harm that the collapse of the deal might entail. This collapse may or may not have much impact on the trade and commercial links with the US but it would almost certainly result in tarnishing India’s image as a country with an excellent non-proliferation track record. The task of the critics of the nuclear deal had become comparatively easier because in the US the whole question of the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal was converted into one relating to proliferation and related security issues that are bothering the Americans.

Soon after the nuclear deal was advertised last summer in Washington as a great show of a new found bonhomie between India and the US, sections within the US establishment and India’s neighbourhood started to make moves to abort it. The best way to succeed in that effort was to shift the focus not on to the question of India’s huge energy needs that was at the core of the nuclear deal but to that of proliferation. In the backdrop of America’s touchy relationship with Iran over the latter’s secret or not so secret nuclear ambitions, proliferation is a hot potato in the US. Most Americans are uncomfortable at the thought of unfriendly regimes acquiring nuclear arms.

If the US allowed India to continue with its nuclear weapons programme even after signing a civilian nuclear deal how could it exert pressure on Iran to give up its own nuclear programme? This was a line that appeals to many Americans, especially those who are either traditionally anti-Indian or those who have moulded themselves into non-proliferation Ayatollahs.

But a great deal of mischief was also apparent behind the attempts to show India as a bad boy in the world of nuclear proliferation. Suddenly, American politicians of various hues, columnists, academics and scientists, all had discovered that India was the original proliferating sinner. There was a striking similarity in their partisan tones. It was as though the AQ Khan network was a great myth now happily buried. It was a ploy to gloss over the proven proliferation records of two countries in this region one of which openly engaged itself in efforts to scupper the Indo-US nuclear deal if it was not offered something similar.

Those who are working assiduously against the nuclear deal may be doing some wrong calculations. The Americans probably know that the Iranian (or the North Korean) nuclear weapons programme will not be hampered by the fate of the nuclear deal with India. The euphoria that a ‘no’ from the US Congress on the nuclear deal will generate in India’s neighbourhood may prove short-lived as it would also end all possibilities of their getting a civilian nuclear deal from the US, which appears to have been informally promised. It may also see some of the nuclear Ayatollahs resurrecting the ghost of AQ Khan and his uniformed patrons. Certainly that will not be to the liking of the General Sahib.


Courtesy : Syndicate Features

Printer-Friendly Version