The central bank in Bangladesh, Bangladesh Bank, on April 5, 2006, imposed a paltry fine of Taka One Lakh (US $1447) on the Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL), the largest Shariah-based bank – which has 169 branches and a total deposit of Taka 110,721.23 million – for its alleged violation of the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002. Action was taken after eight transactions involving the IBBL’s Gazipur and the Lal Dighirpar Branch in Sylhet, amounting to Taka 4.5 lakhs (US $6511), were found to have violated basic banking norms, and in which the money had found its way into the hands of the militants of the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), an Islamist terrorist group proscribed by the Government on February 23, 2005. Bangladesh Bank has reportedly asked the IBBL to take action against 20 of its officials, who the investigators found had colluded with the militants. Irrespective of the results of such belated measures, however, it seems evident that Bangladesh, claiming to have launched a successful and sincere war on Islamist militancy in the country, is still at the very beginning of what could be a long and arduous effort.
It was the recovery of a cheque book issued against an account maintained in an IBBL branch, from the Sylhet hideout of the JMB chief Abdur Rahman, on March 2, 2006, that led to the investigations against the IBBL. However, any earnest inquiry into the financial empire of the Islamist militant outfits would have to proceed beyond such incidental recoveries and would need to take into account the entire gamut of linkages and networks involving local as well as international players, which sustain the radical Islamist movement.
During interrogation after his arrest on March 2, 2006, Rahman merely stated that zakat (voluntary donation), mostly collected during Ramadan, was the main source of income for his organisation. Another arrested JMB leader, Ataur Rahman Sunny, said finance for the outfit consisted of, apart from zakat, subscriptions collected for mosques and madrassas (seminaries) and monthly collections from activists. Other militants disclosed that osor (crop donation), yanat (donation) and their own contributions sustained the group.
It is also common knowledge that generous flows of finance from foreign charities sustain Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. Most notably, the Kuwait based Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), with an ultraconservative Wahhabi agenda, brought in enormous amounts of money to build mosques and madrassas in the country. Nearly 1,000 mosques have been built out of such funds provided by the RIHS. The RIHS’ Pakistan and Afghanistan chapters find mention in the US Treasury Department's ‘Specially Designated Nationals’ listing. A major proportion of such funding is believed to have gone into militant coffers.
Such funds flows have occurred with full Government knowledge through what can be considered ‘legal channels’ throughout the period during which Bangladeshi authorities refused to acknowledge the presence of militants in the country. This ‘age of innocence’ curiously continued even beyond the proscription of the outfits in February 2005, till the August 17, 2005, country-wide blasts. In an interview to Time magazine on April 3, 2006, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia disingenuously stated, “We did not know they were there. After the August 17 bomb blasts, we knew.”
International pressure has, however, forced the Government to change track, and after the post-August 17 arrests, the modes of fund transfer have undergone a change. The RIHS reportedly transferred huge amounts of money through hundi (a traditional undocumented transfer like hawala) after the arrest of Ahle Hadith Andolan Bangladesh (AHAB) chief Asadullah Al Galib in February 2005. The nexus between the Charity and Islamist organisations continues till date. A Bangladeshi national in RIHS, Akramuzzaman Bin Abdus Salam, was present during the AHAB annual conference at Nawdapara in Rajshahi District on February 16-17, 2006. Sources indicate that the RIHS funded the two-day AHAB conference and footed the entire bill, including the transportation costs of all participants.
Funds have also, on occasion, been brought in by a number of Islamist delegates who regularly visit the country. Foreign delegates who visit Bangladesh as guests of various Islamist programmes often stay back for an unusual length of time and meet militant leaders. Important among the foreign Islamist visitors to Bangladesh was Moulana Fazlur Rahman, leader of the Opposition in Pakistan’s National Assembly. Sources indicate that, before the August country-wide blasts, four foreign nationals including two Pakistanis, one Saudi and one unidentified man had watched ‘dummy runs’ and training sessions by Islamist militants at a remote char (riverine island) of Sariakandi in Bogra district. Fazlur Rahman, during his tours to the country had visited militant facilities in Jessore. There is also a disturbing pattern to visits by RIHS officials to Bangladesh, which, in the recent past, have taken place immediately before or after several major terrorist incidents or events linked to extremist activities. Sources also indicate that top RIHS officials' visits are made through diplomatic channels and they had unimpeded opportunities to leave substantial cash behind.
Prior to the current phase of disruption, the JMB’s organisational chart consisted of a seven-member majlis-e-shura (highest decision-making body), 16 regional commanders, 64 district-heads and hundreds of operations commanders. In a media interview in 2004, JMB chief Abdur Rahman indicated that he had a network of 10,000 ehsars or full-time trained operatives and one lakh part-time activists and spends about more than $10,000 a month on organisational activities.
Financial resources at the disposal of the militants were, to say the least, enormous. Arrested shura member Ataur Rahman Sunny, asked about the source of funding, told his interrogators what Abdur Rahman had told him that “money was no problem.” Intelligence sources indicated that JMB spent roughly Taka Six million a year for maintaining its full-time leaders and cadres, and Taka 10 to 50 million a year for buying explosives and firearms. The family of each suicide bomber had been promised Taka 50,000 to 100,000 or more as compensation for their ‘sacrifice’.
No estimate is available on the amount of money used in the August 17 explosions. However, an indication was provided by Rahman, who told Task Force for Interrogation personnel, during the first phase of remand after his arrest on March 2, 2006, that JMB collected 10,000 pounds sterling from two Saudis and the rest of the funds from bank dacoities, looting of NGO offices, zakat funds and other sources. However, on February 8, JMB’s military commander and Shura member Ataur Rahman Sunny and Abdul Awal confessed before a court that two British nationals, identified as Abdur Rahman and Sajjad, provided the JMB chief a sum of 10,000 pounds to carry out bomb attacks at the end of June 2005.
Private financers also constituted a lucrative source for the outfit. Reports in March 2006 indicated that the Government was preparing a list of the 25 financiers, including high-profile politicians and businessmen, who provided money to JMB cadres. The names included five Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, and had been recovered from the SIM cards found in a JMB hideout in Sylhet on March 2, 2006.
Intelligence sources indicate that massive extortion drives also sustained JMB’s activities. The group had about 500 dedicated cadres for collection of funds, mostly targeting the countryside. Evidence suggests that this team is still intact and after the security operations netted about 700 cadres of the outfit, these cadres have moved into the rural areas in different Districts in a bid to collect ‘toll taxes’ and are reportedly spending this money to recruit new cadres for the outfit.
Even after the August 17 blasts, JMB leaders continued to transact through several of their Bank accounts throughout the country. Chequebooks recovered from the JMB’s Rangpur hideout on November 23, 2005, revealed that the group had withdrawn Taka 900,000 from three accounts with two Banks – Al Arafa Islami Bank, Dhaka, and the Bogra Bazar Branch of Sonali Bank in the Bogra District.
Phases of wilful inactivity on part of the Government continue even after the JMB launched a series of suicide attacks targeting the judiciary in several districts. Late in November 2005, the bureau of NGO affairs gave consent to release about Taka 20 million to the Bangladesh branch of the RIHS for training Imams, constructing mosques and madrassas, and for installing tube-wells in the country. According to IBBL sources, RIHS distributed the freshly released fund on November 29, among its contractors through bearer cheques instead of account payee cheques, making it easier for just about anyone to withdraw money from the Bank. “Large numbers of cheques for small amounts are coming in everyday", an unidentified IBBL official disclosed in the first week of December, 2005. Sources indicate that large amounts of money were withdrawn by cheques in the beginning of 2006 from a joint account belonging to the RIHS-run Kidney Dialysis Centre Director Zafar Musa Abu Moaz, an Iraqi national, and RIHS Bangladeshi Office Secretary Fazlur Rahman, from a private bank's Uttara branch in Dhaka, to pay off RIHS officials and carry out ‘construction work’.
On April 2, State Minister for Home Affairs, Lutfozzaman Babar, during a high profile meeting of bureaucrats and secretaries, expressed his unhappiness on the tardy pace of investigations into cases involving militant attacks. Given the Government’s approach to the spread of radical Islam in the country, investigations have indeed progressed at a predictably slow pace. The ongoing inquiries into the financial network of the terrorists are expected to follow this sluggish pattern as well.
The writer is a Research Fellow at Institute for Conflict Management, India.
Courtesy : South Asia Terrorism Portal
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