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OPINION

Waziristan: Deal with the Devil
KANCHAN LAKSHMAN

On September 5, 2006, Taliban leaders in North Waziristan signed a peace agreement with the Government, promising to halt cross-border movement and stop attacks on Government installations and security forces.

The three-page agreement was signed by seven militants on behalf of the Taliban shura (advisory council) and by the Political Agent of North Waziristan, Dr. Fakhr-i-Alam, who signed on behalf of the Government. The seven representatives of militant groups included Mohammad Azad, Saif Ullah, Ahmad Shah Jehan, Azmat Ali, Meer Sharaf, Eid Niaz and Hafiz Mir Hamza. Apart from over 500 tribal leaders and clerics, the ceremony was attended by the General Officer Commanding for the Southern Regions, Maj. Gen. Syed Azhar Ali Shah, who later reportedly embraced the militants.

The agreement, mediated by a tribal Jirga (council), contains 16 clauses and four sub-clauses. Salient features include:

- There shall be no cross-border movement for militant activity in Afghanistan. On its part, the Government pledged not to undertake any ground or air operations against the militants and to resolve issues through local customs and traditions.
- The agreement will come into force with the relocation of the Army from checkpoints in the region. The Khasadar force (a local tribal force) and Levy personnel will take over the check-posts.
- Foreigners living in North Waziristan will have to leave Pakistan, but those who cannot leave will be allowed to live peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement.
- Both parties will return each others weapons, vehicles and communication equipment seized during various operations.
- Tribal elders, mujahideen and the Utmanzai tribe would ensure that no-one attacked security force personnel and state property.
- There will be no target killing and no parallel administration in the agency.
- Militants would not enter the settled districts adjacent to North Waziristan.
- Government would release prisoners held in military operations and would not arrest them again.
- Tribesmens incentives would be restored. The administration is to resolve disputes in accordance with local customs and traditions.
- Government would pay compensation for the loss of life and property of innocent tribesmen during recent operations.
- There is no ban on display of arms. However, tribesmen will not carry heavy weapons.
- A 10-member committee comprising elders, members of political administration and ulema (religious scholars) is to monitor progress of the accord and ensure its implementation.

An unnamed spokesperson of the militants said that the Jirga had assured them that the Government would pay them PKR 10 million if it failed to hand over the weapons and vehicles it had seized during various military operations. According to the signatories, the agreement would lead to peace and stability in the beleaguered region, help in restoring the centuries-old tribal system, and facilitate a troop withdrawal. The Khasadar force is reported to have taken control of the check posts vacated by the SFs after the accord.

Much violence preceded this deal. According to open source information monitored by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, during January 1, 2005-August 31, 2006, 846 people, including 181 civilians and 176 soldiers, were killed; given Islamabad's understated accounts, the suppression of the Press and erratic reportage, the actual numbers could be much higher. It is necessary to reiterate that the local Taliban are in effective control of most of Waziristan, on the Pakistan-Afghan border. What they had already achieved on the ground has now been officially acknowledged.

For the record, this is the third accord that Islamabad has reached with the Taliban-led militants since military operations commenced in July 2002. The first agreement, known as the Shakai deal, in 2004, failed to end violence and eventually collapsed after Nek Muhammad, whose surrender in April 2004 was a widely publicized event, turned his back on the Army and was eventually neutralised in a targeted missile attack on June 17, 2004. A second effort also failed after the agreement signed in February 2005 with the influential Mehsud tribe broke down after Abdullah Mehsud, a Taliban-aligned leader closely linked to the Binoria seminary in Karachi, reneged on the deal and reverted to violence.

Given the past trajectory of inconclusive treaties dominated by lack of definite guarantees, the current truce appears to be headed in the same direction. While it is true that the guns have fallen silent since July 2006, pledges that the Taliban militia would not cross into Afghanistan for terrorist strikes and would also not provide safe havens for foreign militants in Waziristan, are open to scrutiny. And there is no guarantee that militants not on board would abstain from cross-border incursions or attacks on Pakistanis within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Former FATA security chief Brig. (retd.) Mehmood Shah has described the agreement as weaker than the earlier accords, and notes, The Talibans pledges are no more than a general statement that they will not do this and that.

The moot point is that the Taliban has secured immense gains from this present pact. In more ways than one, it is a signal that the Pakistan Army has failed in its quest for a military victory. When operations were launched against the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine in the FATA in 2002, the Army, under enormous pressure from the US, was convinced that a military victory was essential. Four years down the line, it is the proponents of a violent jihad who have achieved strategic success. In the past few days, detained Taliban operatives have been released (more than 130), their arms and ammunition is to be returned and more importantly, they will now have full freedom of movement and activities across Waziristan. Even a cursory reading of the accord indicates that the Government has caved into the demands of the Taliban, a manifest retreat for the state.

Such a retreat also clears the way for a geographical spread of Talibanisation beyond FATA and into the settled Districts of the adjoining North West Frontier Province. In the immediate past, incidents involving Islamist extremists have been reported from areas like Bannu, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. Countering Islamist extremism is not only about bringing order in Waziristan but also about checking the spread of militancy to the rest of the country, something which may be greatly endangered now.

One of the clauses in the accord stipulates that foreigners living in the area will have to leave. However, the whole purpose of this provision is defeated, since the agreement also says but those who cannot leave will be allowed to live peacefully, respecting the law of the land and the agreement. It would be naïve to expect the foreigners an euphemism for militants from a mélange of countries, including Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Arab world whose numbers are believed to be in the hundreds, to vacate their safe havens. A majority of them, wanted in their home countries, have been holed up in Waziristan for years and it is highly unlikely that they would now leave. Sources indicate that, after the Shakai agreement in 2004, not a single foreigner left the region. The marginal reduction in their numbers since then is primarily due to the fact that many have gone missing in action. Further, the local Taliban have never acknowledged that foreign elements are present in the area. Indeed, after the accord was announced on September 5, 2006, a spokesman for the militants reiterated that there were no foreigners and that Islamabad had yet to provide any proof of their presence.

A reversal on the ban on carrying weapons (the deal merely says tribesmen will not carry heavy weapons) and allowing free movement also effectively means that the parallel administration that the local Taliban is running will be consolidated further. Reports indicate that groups of local Taliban regularly patrol the streets of Miranshah, headquarters of North Waziristan, to ensure that the people conform to the Taliban's rigid version of Islam. There has been a stream of reports in the past few months indicating that clerics were replacing chieftains in all committees in South Waziristan. The Taliban have reportedly opened recruiting offices in the Wana, Makeen and Barwend areas of South Waziristan. Moral policing and social edicts in Waziristan are reportedly now an accepted reality: shopkeepers are debarred from trading in music or films in any manner; barbers have been ordered not to shave beards; and women have been told not to go to the market or other public places.

With this accord, the status of the miscreants killed during military operations has abruptly been transformed to martyrs and the Government will pay compensation for casualties and property lost. Maulana Nek Zaman, a Member of the National Assembly and a key mediator, said the Government had released all tribesmen who were arrested during military operations and they would not be re-arrested. All vehicles, belongings and arms impounded will be returned to the tribesmen, he added. The writ of the state, clearly, does not prevail in the area.

The promise that there will be no cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan is, on all indications, not expected to hold. Even as the border is almost impracticable to effectively monitor, Islamabad also appears to be placing an undue amount of faith in the local Taliban, who will not think twice on reneging on their commitments under the cover of credible deniability a long and entrenched tradition in Pakistan. While the porous Durand Line has its own complications vis-à-vis border management, a complete and sustained end to infiltration would also mean that Pakistan foregoes attempts to regain its strategic depth in Afghanistan. As of now, there are no indications of an end-game in Afghanistan and Islamabad is, consequently and at best, only looking for a momentary lull.

On a separate plane, the accord is also a lesser evil for the military regime. With more than 80,000 troops committed in FATA, and struggling to contain the fallout of the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti in the Balochistan province, Islamabad wants to narrow down the regions of strife.

The problem with procured surrenders and induced loyalties, however, is their capricious nature. There are far too many complexities within the local power centres and past experience has shown that loyalties change rapidly, though a temporary patriotism might easily be induced.

Significantly, no sooner had the ink dried on the accord, military spokesperson Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan told ABC News that Osama bin Laden would not be taken into custody under the deal as long as one is being like a peaceful citizen. Questions on high-value targets are bound to sooner or later embarrass Islamabad, especially since it has now conceded the Taliban enormous space. And in the proximate future, a Hezbollah-like structure will crystallize, with the local Taliban militia controlling the ground and the non-militant leadership, drawn essentially from the tribal elders and seminaries, will administer. A diplomat aptly described the developments as akin to putting the fox in charge of the hen house.

The writer is a Research Fellow at Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India.

Courtesy : South Asia Terrorism Portal

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