Pro-Government tribesmen launched ‘operations’ in March 2007 targeting hideouts of the foreign militants as part of a strategy to drive them out of Waziristan. The first round of violence began on March 6 when approximately 19 people, including 12 Uzbek militants, were killed in a clash between the Wazir Zalikhel sub-tribe and foreign militants near Azam Warsak in South Waziristan. The al Qaeda militants, numbering between 500-1000, are now effectively cornered in the hilly terrain, as all roads to the areas where they are holed up are controlled by Maulana Nazir, a pro-Government Taliban ‘commander’ (chief of the Taliban Shura for Ahmadzai Wazir-dominated areas of South Waziristan), and his 1,500 supporters. Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao disclosed: "Fifty-four people were killed today [March 30] and two yesterday. They include 45 foreigners," adding further, "The fighting is going on… it intensified today after peace talks failed. Tribes are insisting on their demand that these people either surrender or quit the area." A Maulana Nazir supporter earlier told Associated Press that local tribesmen had killed 35 Uzbeks and lost 10 of their own men.

According to open source information monitored by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, throughout 2005, 285 people, including 92 civilians and 158 terrorists, were killed in Waziristan in 165 incidents. In 2006, the death toll was 590, including 109 civilians, 144 soldiers and 337 terrorists, in 248 incidents. Just in the first three months of year 2007 have seen approximately 288 people, including 37 civilians, eight soldiers and 243 terrorists, killed, an unambiguous indication of the state of play in Pakistan’s most troubled region. Given Islamabad's understated accounts, the suppression of the Press and erratic reportage, the actual numbers could be much higher.

It is necessary to reiterate that the local Taliban are in effective control of most of Waziristan. The locus of current fighting is in the Azam Warsak, Shin Warsak and Kalusha areas of South Waziristan. Indications are that the violence could escalate since tribal leader Haji Sharif, on March 29, ruled out any negotiations with the foreign militants. Some pro-government tribal commanders have said ‘operations’ would continue until all foreign militants are ‘expelled’ from Waziristan.

The pro-Government tribesmen have, interestingly, targeted only the foreigners – militants from a mélange of countries, including Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Arab world. A majority of the foreign militants are reportedly from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is led by Tahir Yuldashev and his local associates, including Noor Islam, Javed Zalikhel and Maulana Abdul Aziz. While not much information is available on the strategic aspects of what appears to be a vigilante campaign, military spokesperson Major General Waheed Arshad claimed, "It's a success of the Government tribesmen strategy... the tribesmen are fed up with them because they and their activities adversely affect their lives and business." The military regime believes that a vigilante movement by the local tribesmen could curb cross-border attacks by the militants in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government "is not intervening" in the clashes, an unnamed senior security official told AFP: "We hope this onslaught against foreign militants will help reduce cross-border activity. The foreigners were involved in this cross-border activity… This is a decisive battle for us."

There has not been any respite in the fighting despite the fact that a Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam [Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F)]-dominated Jirga (tribal council) had mediated a truce between the two sides on March 22. Niaz Muhammad Qureshi, JUI-F information secretary for South Waziristan, stated after the cease-fire, "We are glad that the two sides conceded to the tribal elders and clerics’ plea for silencing their guns in order to solve their issues through peaceful means." Militant leaders like Baitullah Mehsud, Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of senior Taliban ‘commander’ Jalaluddin Haqqani, and an unnamed Taliban ‘commander’ from Afghanistan reportedly reached unnamed locations in South Waziristan to arrive at the deal. Reports indicate that Maulana Nazir, ‘commander’ of the pro-Taliban militants, was at one point disinclined to a truce. However, the Jirga, in which Government nominees were also present, persuaded him after lengthy discussions.

Islamabad has been trying since 2002 to evict or neutralise the foreign militants in Waziristan. A majority of them, wanted in their home countries, have been holed up in Waziristan for years and it is highly unlikely that they could be persuaded to leave. Sources indicate that, after the Shakai agreement in 2004 (which failed to end violence and eventually collapsed when Nek Muhammad, whose ‘surrender’ in April 2004 was a widely publicized event, turned his back on the Army and was eventually neutralised in a targeted missile attack on June 17, 2004), not a single foreigner left the region. The marginal reduction in their numbers since then is primarily due to the fact that many have gone ‘missing in action’. Further, the local Taliban have never acknowledged that foreign elements are present in the area. Indeed, after the military regime’s accord with the local Taliban in North Waziristan in September 2006, a spokesman for the militants reiterated that there were no foreigners and that Islamabad had yet to provide any proof of their presence. On September 5, 2006, Taliban leaders in North Waziristan had signed a ‘peace agreement’ with the Government, promising to halt cross-border movement and stop attacks on Government installations and security forces. However, the U.S. military and NATO officials now believe that attacks have risen sharply since the deal. Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State, during a visit to Islamabad in March 2007, stated, "I think everybody recognises that, at this point, the political deal in Waziristan has not stopped the militancy." And US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said on March 7 that the Taliban and al Qaeda were using Pakistan's tribal areas, particularly North Waziristan, to regroup. "I would say the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been able to use the areas around, particularly North Waziristan, to regroup and it is a problem," Gates told reporters at the Pentagon. Further, the outgoing US Ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan C. Crocker, said, on March 8, that the peace deal in Waziristan, though "well written", has not been implemented. In an interview to Khyber television channel, Crocker stated: "We asked Pakistan to ensure that the agreement would be respected. I personally appreciate the points written in the agreement but unfortunately the militants haven't respected the agreement because there are some tribal areas where the Pakistan Government doesn't have full control."

When operations were launched against the Taliban-al Qaeda combine in the FATA in 2002, the Army, under enormous pressure from the US, was convinced that a military victory was essential. Four years down the line, it is the proponents of a violent jihad who have achieved strategic success. In more ways than one, it is a signal that the Pakistan Army has failed in its quest for a military victory. The Taliban have de facto control over most of Waziristan and, more importantly, have full freedom of movement and activities across the region. The current round of violence is only a continuation of the manifest retreat of the state.

Part of President Pervez Musharraf’s operational strategy in arriving at peace deals in Waziristan has been to drive a wedge between the local Taliban and foreign militants. Islamabad’s policy in Waziristan remains a curious mixture of force, economic sanctions and political engagement. But none of these appears to be leading to order and stability in the region.

Four years after Pakistani soldiers first entered FATA, there is very little to cheer about for Islamabad. The state has little effective presence in the area, and the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan are nowhere close to governance or stability. Pakistan’s ‘lawless frontier’ is now clearly in the grip of Islamist extremist forces, which have mounted the most serious challenge so far against Islamabad. The Taliban consolidation and violence on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, which shows every sign of consolidation over time, could have disastrous consequences over the long run, for both Islamabad and Kabul.

The writer is a Research Fellow at Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India.

Courtesy : South Asia Terrorism Portal

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