Sensitive ‘leaks’ to the media are often designed to serve a purpose that the government may not be willing to express explicitly. In the US, the ‘free’ Press frequently volunteers to convey unpleasant messages that the administration may not want to communicate directly to a ‘friendly’ nation or its friendlier leader. So, the spate of news items and articles in the influential sections of the American media in recent days would clearly suggest that the prolonged honeymoon between the Bush administration and Gen Pervez Musharraf has finally ended.
Some of these reports even hint that the shotgun marriage that preceded the honeymoon may be heading for annulment. Chances of that happening would depend on the shape that the gathering storm against Musharraf takes in the coming months while the country heads for autumn presidential poll in which Musharraf is seeking another term. However, according to a New York Times article Washington has already drawn up a ‘succession’ plan which foresees Musharraf being replaced by the present deputy chief of the army, Ahsan Saleem Hayat, and a former bank official, Mohammed Mian Soomro, who is presently chairman of the Senate, as the president. Obviously, both these men are acceptable to Washington.
The talk of succession and demands for better results from Pakistan in the war against terror must have rattled Islamabad enough to see the Pakistani envoy in the US, a former General, rush to warn that the removal of Musharraf at this juncture would be disastrous. He said it will destabilise Pakistan (when was it last ‘stabilised’?) and implied that as a result the region would see a mayhem brought about by the radical and fanatical elements hibernating in Musharraf’s Pakistan. But Mahmud Durrani was not saying anything new; this line has been heard ad nauseam from the Pak leadership.
A striking theme of the ‘succession’ plan is that at long last the Bush administration is willing to give up its long-held belief that Musharraf is indispensable for the furtherance of American interests. This writer has always been maintaining that the Americans will have to regret if they go banking on Musharraf for he is neither immortal nor a straightforward person. Interestingly, this is the line most US media and strategic experts have taken lately spurred by Musharraf’s traits - increasing reluctance to go after the terror network even as while professing ‘determination’ to drive away all the terrorists, and pestering the US for more aid in cash and kind.
As it did before 9/11, Pakistan continues to use terrorism as an important means to gain ‘strategic depth’ in the west (Afghanistan) and annexe Kashmir in the east. Musharraf did the so-called U-turn on terrorism after the 9/11 attacks for strategic reasons. It offered him an unexpected opportunity to milk the Americans and bail his country out of the financial crisis that he had inherited in his bloodless coup against Nawaz Sharif almost nine years back. Musharraf was also looking desperately to lift Pakistan from its near pariah state. He has so far collected a reward of at least $10 billion worth of aid. A bonus for him has been his undeserved international stature as a ‘moderate’ Muslim leader.
George W. Bush may still be unwilling to criticise his buddy Musharraf in public but both Houses of American Parliament Congress have now made it plain that the Pakistan ruler should be made to pay for playing a double game with Washington. Unless Bush intervenes personally, the US Congress is going to stipulate that all future aid to Pakistan should be linked to its record in fighting terrorism. Expectedly, Musharraf and his aides have gone into an overdrive to pressurise Bush into vetoing such law.
A former top CIA official, Robert Richer, has openly rubbished the popular myth that radical Islamists would jump into Musharraf’s seat the moment he is ejected—and Pakistan’s Islamic bomb will fall into the hands of Osama bin Laden & Co. This fear, according to him, is spread by Musharraf himself for self preservation. So his conclusion is, “If something happened to Musharraf tomorrow, another General would step in”.
Even if the next General does not figure in the present ‘succession’ plan prepared by Washington it is rather unlikely that it will be an ‘unwanted’ officer. Reason? As a part of his deal with the Americans, Musharraf either removed or sacked ‘Mullah’ Generals, the ones with fanatical leanings, among the top echelons of Pak army.
Of course, men with extremist views dominate the middle level officer cadre as well as the foot soldiers in Pakistan and that may influence their seniors. But then there is a deficit of liberalism or ‘enlightened moderation’ in the entire Pakistani establishment. Irrespective of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the average Pakistani has always been closer to the philosophy preached by the religious fundamentalists with a pronounced anti-Indian and anti-US message. India has learnt to live with this fact and so has, obviously, the US.
Any successor of Musharraf would find it hard to distance himself or herself from the US because it would entail giving up too many good things—money, arms and international prestige. As to the fear that the extremists could push the nuclear button the moment they slip into drivers’ seat in Islamabad, well even the most daft of these fanatics understand that the consequences of a nuclear attack would assure annihilation of the land of the pure.
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