The vehemence of the onslaught on his authority in his country after he removed the chief justice of the Supreme Court must have taken him by surprise because he had got accustomed to a smooth ride. His parents were indulgent towards him when he was a naughty child. Later his superiors, by his own admission, were likewise kind to him when he escaped disciplinary action as a young officer in the Pakistan army. His alleged roving eye never got him into trouble.

His military career took him to the peak through, as his mentor of the time, Nawaz Sharif, might say, out-of-turn but undeserved promotion as chief of staff. And after snatching the throne from the elected leader Sharif for no apparent reason than to teach him a lesson for stopping his Kargil adventure, Musharraf climbed even higher peaks with President George W. Bush projecting him, again undeservedly, as an icon Muslim leader.

But castles built on sand are not durable. The dream world that had surrounded Musharraf is tottering. By all accounts his popularity with the people of Pakistan is close to rock bottom. The world has come to see him as a double-crosser who promised to do utmost to eliminate the terror network in his country but did nothing more than take a few well-publicised steps to hoodwink the West. He told the world that he would mould Pakistan, a creation of hatred, into a nation of ‘enlightened moderation’. But Pakistan is fast slipping into the Taliban mould.

He raised false hopes among gullible Indians that he wanted to forget the past history of bitterness in the sub-continent and forge good relations with India. It will be a surprise if, given the precarious position he finds himself in, he does not now revert relations with India to the more familiar track of hostility. History tells us that a Pakistani leader facing domestic trouble takes immediate recourse to provoking Delhi and raising the bogey of an Indian attack.

Clearly, both India and Musharraf backers in the West have to re-evaluate their strategies towards a Pakistan that is either not ruled by Musharraf or one where his authority has been considerably clipped, enough for any successive regime to repudiate whatever commitment he makes. India has to be extremely cautious in entering into any major agreement with him, especially in regard to the ‘core issue’.

It has been often said that a satisfactory resolution to the Kashmir issue will greatly strengthen Musharraf’s hand, not to mention the fact that it will also ensure his name in the pages of history books. First of all, a ‘satisfactory’ solution to the Kashmir issue is still not in sight. But even if it is emerging from some hidden corner, what is the guarantee that Musharraf’s successor will not reject it.

Musharraf himself, soon after staging his coup, had said that he would not honour the Shimla agreement and the Lahore peace accord between the then Indian prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, because both the commitments were given by his country under ‘duress’.

By now, India is quite familiar with the fact that the period of ‘peace’ between India and Pakistan is always short. It is both preceded and followed by a lengthy innings of hostility. If the General decides to change his tone towards India it will only mean that this country should be ready for any surprise attack from Pakistan now with nuclear arms and long-range missiles. And remember, Musharraf continues to aver that he would not hesitate to strike India first.

Washington too should be worried about the turn of events in Pakistan with a very perceptible decline in the popularity and authority of their man. Most great powers in the West have believed and created the US-inspired myth that a deluge awaits Pakistan after Musharraf. What the Western supporters of Musharraf refused to see during the eight years that he has been in office that the ‘deluge’ in Pakistan had started quite some time ago, right under the nose of Musharraf. Some would say, actually, with his connivance.

Musharraf willingly yielded to the Mullahs and had no qualms in doing a series of deals with them, all for the sake of staying in power. He stonewalled details of AQ Khan’s clandestine nuclear bazaar. Musharraf pandered to the radicals even if meant crushing the ‘enlightened moderation’ urges in his country, with regard to empowerment of women or the abuse of blasphemy laws, for instance.

His method of curbing the fanatic jehadi brigade is farcical. He is never keen to see an end to their militant activities so he repeatedly played the charade of imposing a ‘ban’ on some group only to allow it to resume its nefarious activities by changing its name.

Not that Washington is unable to see through his game but it has refused to exercise its full influence on him on the specious ground that it might infuriate the General and, hence, the West would be left without its all-important ally in the Muslim world. West also turned a blind eye to an unprecedented radical Islamic surge in his country one result of which is that today Pakistan is among the countries where the overwhelming majority of people are anti-US, anti-West and, in fact, against the whole non-Muslim world.

The Taliban influence has spread to most parts of Pakistan except, perhaps, a handful of urban centres, though clearly capital Islamabad is not among them where clerics of the Lal Masjid are now freely issuing edicts that scare the so-called ‘liberals’ and mock at the authorities by raiding houses and music shops at will.

So unflinching is the Western faith in Musharraf and so strong the belief in his indispensability that Washington is working on a ‘deal’ between him and Benazir Bhutto so that the good General can stay in power for at least another five years. The deal might or might not work, though it will be quite surprising that a shrewd leader like Benazir would agree to hug a hugely unpopular military ruler.

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