Pakistan in the month of June, when temperatures across much of that country stay well above 40 degree C, is certainly not a favoured tourist destination for US citizens much less top American officials. But when not one but two important US officials land almost simultaneously in Islamabad in soaring temperatures it will naturally arouse curiosity—and abundant speculation. The two US officials were Richard Boucher, assistant secretary of state, who arrived first on a longer visit, and John Negroponte, deputy secretary of state and a former top US spy, who followed him. Admiral William J. Fallon, chief of the US Central Command also landed at the same time.
The official version that their arrival in Pakistan was a ‘coincidence’ is hard to swallow. The American visitors met and had lengthy discussions with not only the ruling class but also the main opposition political parties in Pakistan and, significantly, the election authorities too. Meeting politicians may not be unusual but high-profile foreign visitors calling on election authorities is, especially when the expected polls in the country later in the year have assumed great importance. Boucher had also travelled to the troubled Balochistan where his arrival was greeted with an ambush of army convoy by suspected pro-Taliban militants.
The current scenario in Pakistan and certain statements made in Washington suggest that Boucher and Negroponte visit was connected to the on-going problems within Pakistan and was the result of a planned move. What could that move be? To bail Gen Pervez Musharraf out of his troubles by cobbling a ‘deal’ between him and a section of the ‘liberal’ opposition? To gauge the mood in the country and prepare an alternative US plan for Pakistan without Musharraf? Know something about how Musharraf might rig the polls expected this autumn? The order of US priorities may be different but some guesses can be made easily.
The troubled political scene in Pakistan has created as much problem for President George W. Bush as for the Pakistan ruler, Gen Pervez Musharraf, who, made the US believe that he is indispensable for its so-called fight against terror. That means that the first job for the present US administration is to ‘save’ Musharraf who, by all accounts, is facing his first real challenge since he snatched power from the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in October 1999 and has been running the country all by himself. O.K., there is a puppet prime minister.
Musharraf, of course, has worked out his own strategy for survival and continuation in office as president as well as chief of army staff. He plans to get himself re-elected as president—without relinquishing his post as army chief--by the present federal and state assemblies before his term expires this autumn. The general elections can then follow as its outcome, even if adverse, would not affect him much.
The US had tacitly approved this sequence of polls that runs counter to the provisions of Pakistan’s Constitution. But an unexpected development, the snowballing countrywide furore over the dismissal of the Supreme Court chief justice, has created some hurdles in the way of the US blandly endorsing the Musharraf game plan for re-election.
The US State Department (foreign office) indulged in some verbal gymnastics before Boucher and Negroponte’s departure for Pakistan. Its spokesman Sean McCormack said with misplaced certainty that Musharraf would ‘put aside’ his uniform and ‘we expect him to follow through on his commitment’. He was also credited with saying, though not in such simple words, that parliamentary elections would precede the ballot to the president of Pakistan. In fact, McCormack said that the US was ‘pressuring’ Musharraf to ‘fulfil’ his promises.
Such statements may suggest that the US administration has had a change of heart about Musharraf. But that will be an erroneous assumption. Because statements coming from Musharraf himself and his minions continue to be quite blunt: Musharraf would not give up his uniform—his ‘second skin’—and would get himself re-elected by the outgoing national and state assemblies. The US reaction? Sean McCormack reiteration that US expects Musharraf to ‘fulfil promises’ with regards to his uniform and the timing of the presidential polls.
Apparently, the US will not mind the method chosen by Musharraf to continue as president; Washington is ready to put up with any embarrassment that it may face if Musharraf continues to hold dual posts without regard to his promises and the constitution. The US may be looking for a suitable successor to Musharraf, as some reports have hinted, but for the moment none is in sight. The US would most certainly like to see Pakistan army shed its considerable weight and power in running the affairs of the country.
An early exit of Musharraf, with or without the uniform and irrespective of the poll timetable, should, therefore, be ruled out. His continuation is linked to the US belief that no one can serve US interests better than Musharraf. This equation can change only if the lawyers’ agitation against Musharraf assumes unmanageable proportions and he is physically pushed out, either by another military man or by the combined force of the opposition political parties.
That is a distinct possibility—but only distinct. A country’s ruler, much less a military strongman, cannot be thrown out by lawyers’ protests. The opposition parties in Pakistan may be united in opposing Musharraf but are not united in fighting him together. Even with the strong anti-Musharraf mood in Pakistan, the main political opposition, Benazir Bhutto’s People’s Party of Pakistan, continues its not-so-secret parleys with Musharraf for a power-sharing deal.
The deal would have been sealed by now had the Iftikar Choudhary episode not intervened. This has enabled Benazir Bhutto to bargain harder and hope for eliciting better terms. A weakened Musharraf may be left with no other option but to accept her terms, maybe not voluntarily but under US ‘persuasion’. It has become amply clear that if there is any Pakistani politician that the Americans might prop up as an alternative to Musharraf at this juncture it will be Benazir Bhutto. Nawaz Sharif has been out of favour since the Clinton administration days. But even Benazir will have to bide her time. Both Benazir and Nawaz may close their ranks to win over the US backing for their joint rehabilitation.
Some analysts have said that the Pakistani opposition politicians have seen a welcome change in the US policy towards Musharraf. There are things about Musharraf that prick Washington. But the bottom line is that the Bush administration has not stripped him of the ‘indispensable’ label. If there is any hard talk against Musharraf in the US it comes from think tanks and editorials, not administration officials. An occasional ‘mild’ admonition from US officials is at once qualified with paeans on Musharraf’s alleged contribution in fighting the ‘war on terror’. It is Washington’s magnificent delusion.
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