Although exchange of fire between government troops and the Islamists had been going on for a number of days there was no doubt that in the end only the absolute, hardcore type would stay and face death. Desertions and attempts to escape were many. This could be followed easily from the television screens. Abdul Aziz Ghazi, senior cleric and the chosen heir of their father, Maulana Abdullah (himself assassinated in sectarian killings), tried to escape by wearing a burqa but was arrested.

Not surprisingly, according to the macho culture that obtains in Pakistani society, he drew public ridicule for proving to be chicken-hearted while the younger brother, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, reportedly a late convert to the rigid and fanatical type of militant Islam stood his ground and fell fighting. The total number of people killed has been reported as 150, of which 10 were army personnel including an officer.

Although the loss of every human life in this manner is a collective and individual tragedy, few of us doubted that at some stage the government would have to assert its authority and demonstrate that the will of the state is paramount and supreme. No state can afford to let an insurgency get out of control, especially one literally evolving under its very nose.

‘Operation Silence’ of the Pakistan Army reminded me in a most striking manner of ‘Operation Blue Star’ launched by the Indian army to flush out the Khalistani militants from the Golden Temple. On both occasions the militant movements originated in governments taking them under their wings to confront rivals -- Mrs Gandhi did it to menace the Akalis and the Pakistani establishment enabled the Islamists to enhance their political clout by banning mainstream parties led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from taking part in the 2002 election. In both cases hardcore elements seemed to have gone into a trance as they courted sure death at the hands of their patrons -- martyrdom according to their own convictions -- laced with overwhelming killing power.

Here are lessons to be learnt for short-term and long-term strategies to bring our young people back to the path of peace and normality. Jihadi literature, whether in print or in video and audio, cassettes and CDS and DVDs must be impounded and destroyed, because it is a gross abuse of the freedom of expression. On the other hand, those who have surrendered and promised amnesty should be helped in rehabilitation.

It would require a multifaceted programme of education that imbibes values such as peace and peaceful resistance. Employment and access to higher education are essential. Just moral sermons will not do. In the long run something will have to be done to free Muslim societies from the tutelage of Islamist ideology. If ever the truth of the English saying 'The taste of the pudding is in the eating' was to be corroborated, the experience of fanaticism and dogmatism which goes under the labels of 'Islamic fundamentalism', 'Islamism' and so on should be amply available.

What has such fanaticism given Muslims of the contemporary era except obscurantist government, outmoded and primitive laws, bad economic and social policy, sectarian killings and defeat in war? I cannot think of one great benefit from adherence to a backward-looking approach. We need to have another close look at the great revolution that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk brought about in Turkey. Notwithstanding rabid propaganda by the Islamists against that great Turkish revolutionary, Turkey has carried forward the best traditions of Sunni state theory -- that the state is a secular institution whose main responsibility is to promote welfare and security of the people.

No doubt the medieval Sunni state was tied down by dogmatism and conservative notions about women, but the emphasis from the time of the pious caliphate and indeed the Umayyad and early Abbasid periods, Granada and Cordoba and later was that the state theoretically at least required obedience to the ruler as long as he worked for the overall welfare and wellbeing of the people.

At the beginning of the Turkish revolution, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk came to the very wise and foresighted conclusion that the universal caliphate had long ceased to represent justice. Therefore, in the long run it proved to be a white elephant which served no other purpose but to keep the Turkish people involved in useless wars and medieval cultural and intellectual traditions.

Therefore, he argued that Turkey should be a secular, national republic in which Sunni-Hanafi religious principles will receive state support while allowing the Alevite minority freedom to practice their faith informally. Consequently all mosques were brought under state control. The clerics became employees of the state whose role was limited to leading prayers and arranging funerals and giving enlightened interpretation to Islamic moral and ethical principles.

Pakistan can adopt this policy and thus bring the mosques directly under control of the state. If the Maulvis are made into proper government servants and are educated in presenting a progressive interpretation of Islam it would greatly facilitate a modern reform of Islam. Since there is a large Shia minority and there are several million Christians and Hindus, Pakistan will have to have a more pluralist policy on organised religion. We have a rich tradition of the ruler being a patron of all religions and this tradition should be modernised and made compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

Some people think that time is out now for General Musharraf. That remains to be seen, but whosoever has the responsibility to lead Pakistan after him will have to decide whether the Pakistani people deserve to move forward or remain stuck in medieval delusions.

The author is a Sr. Research Fellow @ Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.

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