2. That is the question, which has been bothering the US policy-makers despite open expressions of continued support to him not only by officials of the State Department , but also by President George Bush himself, who praised him at one of his media interactions during the recent G-8 summit in Germany. The visits to Pakistan of Mr.Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of South and Central Asia, and Mr. John Negroponte, the Deputy Secretary of State, who functioned as the National Intelligence Director till earlier this year, are indicative of the US concerns over the weakening of the domestic credibility of Gen. Musharraf and its likely impact on the so-called war against Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban. While Mr.Boucher has been throughout supportive of Gen. Musharraf and has consistently praised his contribution to the so-called war, Mr.Negroponte, as the National Intelligence Director, had made no secret of his concern over Pakistan's tribal areas becoming safe sanctuaries for the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda. As the National Intelligence Director, he never over-stated Gen. Musharraf's contribution to the war against Al Qaeda, but as the No.2 in the State Department, he has maintained a discreet silence in public.

3. To quote from a testimony of Mr.Negroponte before the Congressional intelligence committees in January, 2007:"Al Qaeda's core elements are resilient. They continue to plot attacks against our Homeland and other targets with the objective of inflicting mass casualties. And they continue to maintain active connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders' secure hideout in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, Northern Africa and Europe..... Many of our most important interests intersect in Pakistan, where the Taliban and Al Qaeda maintain critical sanctuaries. Pakistan is our partner in the war on terror. It is also a major source of Islamic extremism." (http://www.saag.org/papers21/paper2100.html)

4. Gen. Musharraf's political troubles at home as a result of his arbitrary suspension of Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry from the post of the Chief Justice of Pakistan on March 9,2007, and his subsequent mishandling of the public agitation over this have come at a time when the NATO forces in Afghanistan are unable to make headway in their attempts to crush the resurgence of the Neo Taliban and when Al Qaeda and its International Islamic Front (IIF) have stepped up their activities across the world as seen from the continuing wave of suicide terrorism in Iraq, and its spread to Somalia and Algeria. The situation has been rendered more worrisome by the growing phenomenon of angry anti-US Muslims in Pakistan and in the Pakistani diaspora in West Europe and the US seeking to emulate Al Qaeda even if they do not support its pan-Islamic objectives and anti-Shia operations in order to give vent to their anger against the US.

5. What has become evident is that while Musharraf undoubtedly contributed to the initial successes of the US operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the Afghan territory in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homeland, he has been of little help---either due to his unwillingness or incapacity or both--- in countering the come-back staged by the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda from sanctuaries in Pakistan. Some of his actions have created doubts about the sincerity of his co-operation with the US. Examples: His failure to act against the extremist madrasas despite his repeated promises to do so; his refusal to accept reliable evidence produced by the US intelligence regarding the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban in Pakistani territory; and his avoidance of firm action to stop the Talibanisation of not only the tribal areas of Pakistan, but also of other areas lest there be a confrontation with the extremist religious forces.

6. There is a growing realisation in the policy-making circles in the US that the time has probably come for a mid-course correction in the present US policy of supporting Musharraf right or wrong. The US is not yet prepared to dump Musharraf. His continuing value in US eyes---despite his unhelpful role in the operations against the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda--- arises from the fact that he has been amenable to giving the US an active role in ensuring the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and in preventing its falling into the hands of the anti-US jihadi and fundamentalist elements. The US has had largely unrestricted access to Pakistan's nuclear establishments and has been quietly allowed by Musharraf to closely monitor----through its technical intelligence agencies and ground monitors--- the security of the arsenal.

7. While contemplating an after-Musharraf scenario, the US is worried not so much by the likelihood of an aggravation of the ground situation in the areas on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as by the danger of a weakening of its role in ensuring the security of the nuclear arsenal. A nighmarish scenario, which continues to haunt US policy-makers and intelligence and security experts is the possibility of another 9/11 in the US homeland---this time involving the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) material by Al Qaeda. God forbid, but if this happens, the attempt would have once again been orchestrated from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region as the 9/11 strikes were and the WMD material could have come from Pakistan.

8. If instability in Afghanistan in the wake of the triumph of the Taliban in capturing Kabul in September, 1996, inexorably led to the 9/11 strikes in the US homeland, the growing instability in Pakistan due to Musharraf's mishandling of the situation could inexorably lead to a repeat of 9/11. How to stop the spread of the instability before it becomes unstoppable? That is the dilemma facing the US.

9. Should the US facilitate the smooth exit of Musharraf from power with his honour intact or should it work for his continuance in power with the reversion to the Troika arrangement, which was set up under the US prodding after the death of Gen.Zia-ul-Haq in a plane crash in August, 1988? Under this Troika arrangement, the President (then the late Ghulam Ishaq Khan), the Prime Minister (then Mrs.Benazir Bhutto) and the Chief of the Army Staff (then Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg) enjoyed equal responsibility for the governance of the country with the responsibility of the COAS in matters relating to the nuclear arsenal being absolute and not subject to any checks either by the President or the democratically-elected Prime Minister.

10. The US is not yet prepared to contemplate the exit of Musharraf from power.It is, therefore, trying for the old Troika arrangement----with Musharraf continuing as the President with his powers, including those derived from his chairmanship of the National Security Council set up by him in 2003 intact, appointing a democratically-elected leader as the Prime Minister and shedding his uniform and appointing an officer commanding his as well as Washington's confidence as the COAS. If Musharraf continues as the President, the question of Nawaz Sharif returning as the Prime Minister would not arise. Not only Musharraf, but even many of the senior Army officers dislike him immensely. That would the leave the choice to either Benazir, who enjoys the confidence of the US, but not of many senior Army and intelligence officers, or Shahbaz Sharif, the brother of Nawaz, who would enjoy the confidence of many Army officers, but not necessarily of the US. It should be possible for the US to make the Army and intelligence officers accept Benazir as it did in 1988.

11. The choice for the post of the COAS would be between Gen.Ahsan Saleem Hayat, the army's Vice Chief of Staff, who is a Punjabi, and Gen.Ehsan ul-Haq, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee , who is a Pashtun and who, as the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), contributed considerably to the initial US successes in 2001 and 2002 in its operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Like Musharraf, Gen. Hayat and Gen. Haq have already crossed the age of superannuation, but have been allowed to continue in service. Gen. Hayat reached the age of superannuation on December 8, 2004, and Gen. Haq on April 4, 2005. Since the posts presently held by Hayat and Haq are tenure posts they can continue for three years. Gen. Hayat's tenure will end in December, 2007, and Gen. Haq's in April, 2008. Politically, Gen. Haq has been more useful to Musharraf than Gen. Hayat. Haq is a close personal friend of Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the Amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI), who holds him in some esteem. In 2003, it was Haq, who persuaded the Qazi to give up his opposition to Musharraf continuing as the COAS. Gen. Hayat has been a loyal subordinate of Musharraf, who ensured the effectiveness of Musharraf's role as the COAS.

12. Musharraf is not yet reconclied to giving up the post of COAS. It has enabled him to ensure that those known for their loyalty to him were promoted and placed in key positions. Many of the actions which he took initially such as the removal of Lt.Gen.Mohammad Aziz Khan, the fundamentalist Sudan from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), from the post of the Chief of the General Staff and of Lt. Gen.Mahmood Ahmed from the post of the DG of the ISI before the US started its operations in Afghanistan in October, 2001, might not have been possible if he had not been the COAS. The US distrusted both these officers.

13. His continuance as the COAS also facilitated other important decisions at the US prodding such as allowing the US Air Force to use the Pakistani Air Force bases in Balochistan, allowing US naval ships to unload their supplies in the Karachi port and having them airlifted to Afghanistan and closely associating US experts in ensuring the security of the nuclear arsenal. In a Troika arrangement, will an independent COAS carry forward the policies of Musharraf on this subject or will there be a clash between an ex-serviceman President and a serving Army officer. The kind of influence, which Musharraf commands over the Army's decision-making today as the COAS, he may not command as an ex-COAS even if he be the President.

14. How to ensure no dilution of the security arrangements relating to the nuclear arsenal, which have been put in place since 9/11? One way of doing so would be to give the new COAS all powers relating to the day-to-day running of the Army----including the powers of promotion and posting---, but to retain in the hands of Musharraf as the President all powers relating to the security of the nuclear arsenal.

15. The problem confronting the US arises from the fact that Musharraf is not yet prepared to read the writing on the wall. Though shaken, he continues to be defiant. The fact that he is shaken is evident from his seeking the endorsement of his Corps Commanders for his handling of the present crisis and for his holding both the posts and from his seeking a similar endorsement from the civilian political leaders in the ruling coalition. While the Corps Commanders have given the endorsement, the civilian political leaders in the ruling coalition are reluctant to do so. They are afraid that if they did so they might lose the forthcoming elections. His defiance is evident from his attempts to have the suspended Chief Justice discredited by the chiefs of the intelligence agencies and from his apparent belief that he can still retrieve the ground lost by him through a policy of divide and rule. Musharraf is not prepared as yet to make a commitment on the post of the COAS.

16. India has a vital interest in the present developments in Pakistan. It is in India's interest to see that democracy succeeds in Pakistan. At the same time, it is also in its interest to see that nothing happens in Pakistan, which could lead to an aggravation of the jihadi threats from Pakistani territory directed against India and Afghanistan and that fundamentalist and extremist elements do not gain control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

17. There is scope here for close US-India consultations. If the US is really sincere in its professions of a strategic partnership with India, it should welcome such consultations and take the initiative in starting them.

The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi.

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