A nine-member bench of the Supreme Court dismissed six similar constitutional petitions (filed by Jamaat-e-Islami chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Tehreek-e-Insaf chairman Imran Khan and others) challenging the holding of two offices by President General Pervez Musharraf and his candidature for re-election in uniform, declaring them "not maintainable". The 6-3 majority verdict "did not touch upon the substance of the petitions. Nor did the Bench make any observation on the recent changes to the election rules made by the Election Commissioner, favouring President Musharraf." The verdict simply maintained that the "petitions, which pleaded for the Court’s intervention since an issue of public importance relating to fundamental rights was involved, could not be maintained on these grounds." The short order read:

For reasons to be recorded later, as per majority view of 6 to 3, these petitions are held to be not maintainable within the contemplation of Article 184 (3) of the Constitution. As per minority view of Mr. Justice Rana Bhagwandas, Mr. Justice Sardar Muhammad Raza Khan and Mr. Justice Mian Shakirullah Jan, all petitions are held to be maintainable under Article 184 (3) of the Constitution and are hereby accepted. Constitutional petition No. 63 of 2007 re: Dr Anwarul Haq vs Federation of Pakistan and others is disallowed to the extent of seeking permission to contest the election to the office of president. As per majority view, these petitions are hereby dismissed as not maintainable.

In a certain sense, this is a complete reversal of the more recently manifested independence of the judiciary and the assumed political role of the highest court of justice. Legal analysts opined that the Court did not discern the "substance of the petitions" since it was badly divided and may have also wanted to avoid any plausible confrontation with the military regime. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, one of the petitioners, "had earlier declared to the Press that the opposition parties have reservations regarding the attitude of the judges who, he feels, have been compromised and are under Government pressure."

Despite this ‘technical victory’, Musharraf is not yet out of the woods. A fair amount of uncertainty still exists with regard to the course of the rapidly changing political process. Moreover, he must also fulfil the promise he made to the Supreme Court that "if elected" he would doff his uniform before taking a fresh oath of office.

However, the processes of elections, et al, do not change the fundamentals of the troubled situation in Pakistan. Irrespective of the configuration of the political formation that would assume power once the Presidential elections and the various ongoing ‘deals’ with political parties – including exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), there is no real transformation since the military would remain at the helm of affairs and the flag of extremist Islam would continue to flail vigorously across Pakistan, even as the state gradually withers away.

Nevertheless, escalating crises are immediately at hand, among them, the issue of a failing Musharraf’s grip on the Army after he doffs his uniform. What would be the contours and powers of a civilian presidency? Would the Army’s power-play undergo a radical shift after Musharraf relinquishes direct command? Reports indicate that General Musharraf has already appointed loyalists to key posts in the Army and reshuffled the hierarchy before his promised resignation (a commitment he has made to the Supreme Court, not to mention his wider public commitment and assurances to the American leadership) from the post of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The significant among these new appointments is that of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj as Director-General of the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Once considered "General Musharraf’s eyes and ears as head of the Military Intelligence," Taj, as a Brigadier, was also Musharraf’s military secretary during the 1999 coup. He succeeded Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, who is widely believed to be a possible successor to Musharraf as Army Chief. Maj. Gen. Mohsin Kamal has been appointed as Corps Commander of Rawalpindi, a key post historically connected directly to the trajectory of power in Islamabad and the succession of coups the country has experienced. Kamal replaced Lt. Gen. Tariq Majid, another possible successor to Musharraf as COAS. Further, Musharraf promoted six top commanders to the rank of Lieutenant General. In combination, these various moves are obviously designed to ensure continued control of the Armed Forces after he assumes the identity of a ‘civilian President’, eight years after he ousted Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup.

Amidst a fair amount of speculation on the ‘transition’ to a civilian presidency, it is crucial to note that General Musharraf, "during his six-day-long discussions [in July 2007] with his top military aides in Rawalpindi after the restoration of the Chief Justice, is said to have been advised by his then Corps commanders that the best thing for him to do is to seek an "honourable exit"."

Meanwhile, with narratives of a crisis-ridden presidential election escalating, the diffusion of turmoil across the length and breadth of the country and the intensification of its multiple insurgencies shows no signs of abating. Indeed, "the growth and resurgence of emboldened extremists continues to form a dangerous backdrop to power jockeying in Islamabad."

In a welter of violence, at least 1,896 people, including 655 civilians, 354 security force (SF) personnel and 887 terrorists, have died in 2007 (till September 30). This adds to the 1,471 persons, including 608 civilians and 325 SF personnel, who died in terrorism/insurgency-related violence in Pakistan during year 2006. Crucially, the 2006 level already reflected well over a doubling in fatalities since 2005, when a total of 648 persons (including 430 civilians and 81 SF personnel) were killed in insurgent and terrorist conflicts. Large and widening tracts of Pakistan are now clearly violence-afflicted with an extended array of anti-state actors engaging in varying degrees of armed activity and subversion. A cursory look at the map indicates that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan are witnessing large-scale violence. Islamist extremist activities in parts of the Sindh and Punjab provinces have brought these areas under the security scanner as well. The writ of the military regime under General Musharraf is currently being vehemently challenged – violently or otherwise – across wide geographical areas, on a multiplicity of issues, and with the troubles reaching into the heart of Islamabad and Rawalpindi as well.

The magnitude of Pakistan’ slide into anarchy is best illustrated in the fact that between March 22, 2002 (the first suicide attack) and 2006, there were 22 suicide attacks and just in 2007 (till September 28), there have already been 41 of them. In the past three months, the fidayeen have unceasingly targeted Army convoys and check-posts, police stations and training units, government officials, restaurants and mosques. Another indication of the state collapse is visible in the fact that a small group of approximately 20 militants captured at least 280 soldiers, including a colonel and nine officers, after intercepting a military convoy in the Momi Karam area of Luddah subdivision in South Waziristan on August 30, 2007. Not a single bullet was reportedly fired by the soldiers. At the time of writing, the soldiers were still being held hostage.

A more dangerous facet of this escalating instability is that processes of radicalisation have been strengthened immensely under the Musharraf regime. The NWFP has swiftly crystallized as the core of Islamist militant mobilisation in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region even as radical Islamists rapidly expand their presence across the other Provinces. It is significant that the NWFP is a region where the state’s presence has been relatively strong in the past, and the situation has never been even remotely comparable to the traditionally ungoverned FATA. A comprehensive failure to control the widening insurgencies, sectarian strife and Islamist terrorist violence, now envelope large swathes of Pakistan.

Evidently, Pakistan’s problems will not vanish with the October 6 ballot and General Musharraf’s almost certain re-election as President. The state of play across Pakistan continues to remain critical, and a ‘civilian presidency’ or an ‘elected’ civilian Government in the immediate future will not only continue to face problems ensuing from processes of radicalisation and the retreat of state, but may well be part of the circumstances resulting in their acceleration. Irrespective of the dramatis personae, Pakistan will continue to remain the "epicentre of global instability", and its unfortunate reality is that every new ‘solution’ will bring with it new and potentially greater problems.

The writer is a Research Fellow at Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India.

Courtesy : South Asia Terrorism Portal

Printer-Friendly Version