Even with all the preceding drama of protests, suspense over court verdict and uncertainty about the ‘reconciliation’ deal (more like a ‘bargain’ deal) struck on foreign soil with Benazir Bhutto, the presidential poll in Pakistan ended predictably. The opposition, divided as it is, was never in a position to challenge Gen Pervez Musharraf. His re-election looked all the more certain when Washington extended its wholehearted support to him, pretending not to know about the violation of the country’s constitution by their all-time favourite General or the steep drop in his popularity ratings.
The Pakistani Supreme Court’s effort to inject some excitement into the poll process by ordering a delay in the official announcement of the presidential poll result (at least by October 17) may well end with a whimper, going by past experience. In any case Musharraf has made it clear that if the presidential chair is denied to him he will stay on as army chief. While it looks strange that he gets away after issuing such a warning, as the president with his uniform he will undoubtedly have no reservation in declaring a state of emergency or even imposing martial law. However, that eventuality is rather remote and Musharraf’s party, the PML (Q) is confident that the court cannot undo his election.
The Bush-Musharraf duo of mutual admirers, perhaps now enlarged to a trio with Bhutto’s inclusion, is the only group that is satisfied with the legality and morality of the just concluded presidential poll. Bhutto can return home without the fear of being arrested on corruption charges and, can hope to get a slice of power, most probably as prime minister after the ‘minor’ irritant of a constitutional hurdle that prevents her from assuming office a third time is cleared.
How the Musharraf-Bhutto equation plays out? Neither is known to be willing to play second fiddle to the other. Bhutto cannot hope to see full civilian rule restored as long as Musharraf remains the boss, with or without his uniform. He represents the military, not the civilians, and he is not keen on diluting the powers that he enjoys as president. He will not like to see the ‘civilian’ rulers as the complete masters of the country. Pakistan is not moving any closer to ‘democracy’, an alleged aim of Islamabad’s patrons who exhibit colossus naiveté in believing that the so-called war on terror cannot be fought without Musharraf and suspend their belief when he talks of restoring civilian rule and democracy in Pakistan.
If the Pakistani constitution is quite explicit that a serving army general (or anyone else holding a government job) is not eligible to stand for president what is there to decide about it? Is it a normal practice in any democracy to let an assembly, with or without its full membership, nearing the end of its life elect its leader for another term? Musharraf was allowed to contest so as not to interrupt the election process after it had been set in motion. If the fear was that disqualifying Musharraf at the very first stage would have caused problems the chances would magnify several fold if Musharraf’s candidacy is declared ineligible after the polling.
The road to restoration of ‘democracy’ in Pakistan has thus begun on a false note and yet it receives praise in Washington and other Western capitals where crocodile tears are routinely shed for democracy, or rather lack of it, in many parts of the world. How does Musharraf’s contrived re-election—he received more than 90 percent of the votes polled--become credible, leave alone legitimate, under the circumstances in which it took place?
Here is a president, actually self-appointed, who forces opposition leaders into exile, arbitrarily arrests those who disagree with his policies, refuses to get rid of terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure in his country and is yet applauded by Washington as harbinger of ‘democracy’ to his country and a great warrior against terrorism!
Such blatant contradictions are not confined to the US. For the better part of the last six years Musharraf has been spewing venom against politicians in his country who, he says, have only had lined their pockets with unabashed greed and speed. Now his tune has changed slightly, because he needed some civilian allies to mitigate his troubles.
Similarly, till yesterday—literally so—Benazir Bhutto was unsparing in her criticism of the military dictator. She was telling all those who cared to listen that she would not rest till she has dethroned Musharraf who, she said many times, was not interested in containing fundamentalism in the country and in transition to democracy.
In the end, Musharraf and Benazir struck a bargain with the blessings of Washington. It is supposed to give him a new ally, a useful substitute for the fundamentalists who had jumped to his side soon after he assumed power but have lately turned against him. Musharraf’s crusade against ‘corruption’—if it is still on--will be selective, no more directed against Benazir Bhutto and her husband, Asif Zardari. He will nevertheless train his guns on Nawaz Sharif to give the impression that he is still fighting corruption at home.
Musharraf granted pardon to Benazir Bhutto in the manner of a potentate in medieval times but continues to reserve his spite for Sharif for two reasons. One, Sharif has been making some statements that expose Musharraf as a wily but unreliable military leader. Two, from the United States point of view Bhutto is more pliable than Sharif.
By concentrating his ire on Sharif Musharraf may be strengthening the former. But the irony is that he is appealing for national ‘reconciliation’ without willing to give up his efforts to destroy an important political party. Benighted Musharraf may have successfully fought most of his battles while winning a second term as president but his real political battle is just about to get under way. How will he fare? No body knows. Even he himself.
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