Figures for 2007 reconfirm the continuously declining trend of terrorist violence in the State since the peak of 2001. According to data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management, the fatality index in 2007 decreased by 30.38 percent in comparison to 2006. While there was a substantial decrease in civilian fatalities (164 in 2007 as against 349 in 2006) and those of the terrorists (492 in 2007 as against 599 in 2006), there was only a marginal decrease in Security Force (SF) personnel killed (121 in 2007 as against 168 in 2006).

Comparative Fatalities in J&K, 2001-2007

According to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), in 2007 (till November), the number of militancy-related incidents was down by 33 per cent and that of civilians killed by 59 per cent and SF personnel by 28 per cent over the corresponding period of the previous year. According to the J&K Government/J&K Police, there were 1,054 incidents (till November 30) as against 1,667 in 2006. Over 4,000 illegal weapons, including AK-47 rifles, pistols/revolvers, UMGs/LMGs, rocket launchers/boosters and huge quantities of ammunition and explosives/IEDs were recovered in the State through 2007.

Diminished violence, however, did not indicate a necessary decline in the capacity for terrorism, and there are clear indications that the infrastructure that supports and sustains the Kashmir jihad remains intact in Pakistan. Official sources disclose that at least 52 terrorist training camps were still operating, including 30 in Pakistan and Gilgit-Baltistan, and the rest in the area of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) referred to as Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK). At least one-third of these camps are known to be "fully active" at any given point of time.

Moreover, the decrease in levels of violence in J&K is not due to any change in Pakistani intent, but is rather the consequence of "changes in capacities and compulsions in Pakistan." The multiplicity of crises in Pakistan has diluted Islamabad’s capacities to sustain past levels of terrorism in J&K – "particularly since a large proportion of troops had to be pulled back from the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border for deployment in increasingly violent theatres in Balochistan, NWFP [North West Frontier Province] and the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]… Pakistan's creeping implosion has undermined the establishment's capabilities to sustain the 'proxy war' against India at earlier levels." On a more general level, the secular decline in violence witnessed since September 2001 can be attributed to Pakistan’s compulsions arising out of its domestic difficulties, the ongoing peace process, the American and international pressure on Islamabad and the successes of the counter-insurgency grid in J&K. Official sources indicate that the ratio of SFs to terrorists killed has seen an upward trend from 1:3.6 in 2006 to 1:4.3 in 2007. This is a clear indication that the counter-insurgency grid is working well in J&K, and that any review of troop deployment at this juncture – a populist issue in the State – would fritter away the gains made by the SFs.

The decrease in jihadi violence in J&K has, however, been paralleled by a shift in the Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorists’ focus to the Indian heartland, with as many as 140 persons (all civilians) killed in Islamist terrorist attacks outside J&K through 2007, in locations as varied as Varanasi, Lucknow and Faizabad in Uttar Pradesh, Ajmer in Rajasthan, Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh and Panipat in Haryana. By comparison, 164 civilians were killed in jihadi terrorist attacks in the whole of J&K in 2007. These trends suggest that J&K is gradually emerging as a launching-pad for terrorist attacks across India. Investigations into these attacks have confirmed that each of them had linkages to the Kashmiri jihad in terms of human and logistics support. This shift in the pattern of violence from J&K to other locations offers Pakistan greater ‘deniability’, and also enables it to harness the grievances – real or perceived – among the Indian Muslims. Such a shift in strategy constitutes no radical departure, or even nuanced reorientation, of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)/jihadi agenda. It lies "entirely within the paradigm that has been sustained since the Zia-ul-Haq regime, and has progressively translated itself into the Islamist fundamentalist and terrorist movements in the region."

In J&K, SF operations have seen extraordinary successes in targeting the terrorist leadership. During 2007, eighty seven terrorist leaders were neutralised. Among the terrorist groups, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) was the worst hit. In 2007, 34 of its leaders, including two ‘divisional commanders’, five ‘district commanders’, eight ‘commanders’, four ‘battalion commanders’, and three ‘A category commanders’, were killed across the State, along with 307 HM militants. 22 leaders of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) including, four ‘divisional commanders’, five ‘district commanders’, five ‘commanders’, two ‘area commanders’, a ‘chief operations commander’, and two ‘section commanders’, were killed by the SFs in 2007. The year also saw 18 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) leaders, including one ‘divisional commander’, four ‘district commanders’, six ‘commanders’, and four ‘battalion commanders’, neutralised by SFs. Six ‘commander’ rank jihadis from the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), three each from the Al Badr Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI), and one from the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM) were also killed in 2007.

The top militants killed in 2007 included Bilal Afghani aka Chhotta Bilal, ‘chief commander’ of the Al Badr Mujahideen, on December 3, in Budgam; followed by Qari Umar (‘deputy chief’ of HuJI for J&K) on November 12 in Baramulla; Abu Hamza (‘chief operations commander’ of the JuM) on October 11 in Baramulla; Qasim Bhatti (‘chief operations commander’ of the LeT) on October 4 in Bandipora; Mohammed Shafi aka Nasir-ul-Islam (HM ‘divisional commander’) on September 26 in Doda; Aijaz Ahmed Chopan (‘chief operations commander’ of HM) on August 26 in Ramban; Abu Talah aka Taib (‘operations commander’ of LeT in the Jammu region) on August 8 in Kupwara; Mohammed Abid Hussain Basra aka Zargam (HM ‘divisional commander’) on August 1 in Doda; Mohammad Younis (‘commander-in-chief’, HM Pir Panjal Regiment) on March 1 in Rajouri; Mohammed Khalid-ur-Rehman (LeT’s ‘India Commander’) on July 18 in Doda; and Noor Mohammad aka Ansari (‘divisional commander’ of HuM) on January 20 in Doda. These fatalities continued a trend established over the previous years, with at least 101 terrorist leaders killed in 2006, adding to 125 killed in 2005. The HM has lost 179 ‘commanders’ at various levels since 2003; the LeT, 123; and JeM, 64. The tremendous rate of attrition at the leadership levels has made it difficult for the various terrorist groups to find replacements for their field commanders.

The General Officer Commanding (GOC) 15 Corps in Kashmir valley, Lt Gen A. S. Sekhon, stated on November 1, 2007, that there were 1,500 militants operating in the State, including 700 to 800, in the Kashmir Valley. Earlier, the GOC 16 Corps of the Northern Army Command, Lt. Gen. T. K. Sapru, had disclosed, on August 23, 2007, that nearly 200 Pakistan-trained militants had crossed over to the Indian side of the LoC in the preceding six months, while at least 400 militants, including a large number of foreigners, were operating in the Jammu region. Sapru added, further, that the proportion of foreign terrorists operating on the Indian side was just below 50 per cent, compared to the locals.

Infiltration into J&K during 2007 may have dropped marginally in comparison to the preceding two years. According to Sriprakash Jaiswal, Union Minister of State for Home, there were an estimated 499 cases of infiltration in 2007 (till October), whereas in 2005 and 2006, the figure was 597 and 573 respectively. Jaiswal disclosed further, on November 27, 2007, that these figures pertained to those militants who had been apprehended or killed while crossing the LoC/borders.

A.K. Mitra, Director General of the Border Security Force (BSF), on November 30, 2007, noted that, "A shift in the pattern of infiltration has been observed since 2005... the terror outfits infiltrate in large numbers across the international borders in order to succeed even after encounters with the Security Forces". He indicated that the risk involved in cutting the fence and making an entry point for a small group was the same as with larger groups. Due to the increased risk involved in crossing the borders, militants have tried unconventional methods and high-tech equipment for infiltration. Mitra disclosed that, "Though infiltration numerically has come down as compared to 2006, nevertheless the middle- or lower-level cadres continue to infiltrate through Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir." Official sources also said that, as infiltration attempts are more frequently foiled across the LoC, militants are increasingly using ingress routes via Nepal. Moreover, with the troops more effectively securing the conventional infiltration routes, the militants have reportedly changed tactics and now try to infiltrate through the "not-so-common" routes primarily in the hilly areas of the border Districts of Poonch (Mendhar, Balnoi, Balakote, Krishnaghati) and Rajouri (Bhimber Gali, Kanga Gali, Nowshera).

The Pakistan Army has also reportedly developed a new kind of "floating air pillow" for ingress via newly developed infiltration routes through rivers along the LoC and International Border in the Jammu sector. The "air pillows" were said to have been successfully used by a group of five militants to infiltrate into Indian territory from Munawar Tawi along Sunderbani-Khour sector on the Rajouri-Jammu border in November 2007.

The new ranks of militants in J&K are "more lethal, motivated and well qualified, who dare to seek direct contact with security forces", according to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Though fewer in number, the militants are now using new ways and means to sustain their operations not only in the State but across the Indian heartland. Deputy Inspector General (Ops) of CRPF, N. C. Nathanael, disclosed in Srinagar, on November 29, 2007, in his presentation on 'New Formats of Militancy and Violence in the Valley', that the militants now had a higher striking capability: "There are now long fire stand offs and frequent IED attacks… They (militants) try to work with low risk and high gains. Earlier, we used to search them but now they come pro-actively and strike." He added, further, "we have also seen single cell operations in which only one person operates and that way when the person is caught or the operation is successful no evidence is left." Militants are also attempting to harness advantages accruing from modern technology. According to Nathanael, "They have online terror training through which they try to motivate more and more youth. Besides, they use e-mails, SMS and mobiles for information and operation purposes. Earlier we could intercept the e-mails through servers, but now they are operating through a single mail address at two different places. They pass the password in a code message and use the same account which makes it difficult to intercept."

Nevertheless, the unstable domestic scenario in Pakistan has had an impact on the Kashmir jihad, though it has not led to any change in the intent or the infrastructure that orchestrates violence. There is, nonetheless, a definite pause. The momentary waning in intensity has led to some confusion within the jihadi rank and file. For instance, radio messages and phone calls across the LoC indicated that militants, preparing for a winter stay in the Kashmir Valley, were a worried lot with the declaration of the Emergency in Pakistan. Communication intercepts by Indian intelligence agencies brought out the "uncertainty and confusion" among militants who rely heavily on logistical support from their handlers in Pakistan. Their immediate anxiety, during that particular period, was whether the supply lines would continue. Intelligence officials disclosed, "The militants are currently in a state of confusion about the developments across the border. Even their handlers are not clear how things will shape in the future."

Within J&K, Islamabad is also endeavouring to raise a united political voice in its favour. To this end, it is attempting to engineer unity among various pro-Pakistan groups, including the two factions of the main secessionist formation, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The objective appears to be to gradually transform the predominantly terrorist movement into a more wide-based movement of political extremism, backed by calibrated terrorist operations, to secure a stronger position at the negotiating table and achieve what has not been possible on the ground through terrorism alone.

Even as the troops continue to engage the terrorists, Indian Army sources claim that, with the increasing turmoil in Pakistan, ‘sleeper’ terrorist cells in J&K have been progressively activated and there is a possibility of a gradual upsurge in violence over the coming months. Intelligence sources suggest that militant groups could raise the stakes in an election year in J&K.

The proximity of elections has also brought enormous political pressure to bear on the populist issue of a troop cut in the State, but the Army insists that the situation is far from conducive to such a measure. Indeed, the ratio of troops in J&K is far below the troops-civilian ratio in violence-afflicted Waziristan in Pakistan or even in Chinese occupied Tibet. The J&K Governor, Lt. Gen. (Retd) S K Sinha, noted, on January 25, 2008, the eve of Republic Day, that "The ratio of deployment of troops, Army and paramilitary, to population in the region, excluding militancy-free Ladakh, is 1:40. This is less than 1:37 in Waziristan and 1:28 in Tibet."

Though violence levels are down and there is a perceptible improvement in normal life patterns in the State, there is no compelling rationale for a lowering of guard. Grave risks also loom large in the future: "if Western attention is diverted from the region, or if the Islamists in Pakistan are able to carve out autonomous capacities and regions, free of their dependence on the state's covert agencies, or if there is a radical escalation in the 'global jihad' in the wake of the proposed US withdrawal from Iraq in the foreseeable future, the developments in Kashmir could once again find the state unprepared as the situation spirals out of control."

The gains of 2007 cannot be allowed to lead to complacency. Pakistan’s intentions remain unchanged; its terrorist reserves are intact; Islamist terrorist groups have established some autonomous capacities for operation, independent of Pakistani state agencies; and the South Asia and wider Asian region teeters on the brink of spiralling instability. In the long war against Islamist terrorism, the partial relief in J&K could well prove the calm before a rising storm.

The author is Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India.

Courtesy : South Asia Terrorism Portal

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