In this case it is the loss of a particular equipment which controls the frequency within which the guns and missiles of a regiment dedicated to protecting Indian airspace and preventing penetration by enemy aircraft, missiles, remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are operated.

This information can be utilized by the enemy to create electronic counter measures (ECM) by which the radar equipment in which those magnetrons are used can be jammed in preparation for a pre-emptive strike. Such jamming will render the radar blind to the incoming threat and rob the Indian armed forces in this case the Army Air Defence Regiment of the means of reacting to the threat by directing missiles, guns or dedicated aircraft to intercept the incoming objects.

It is being made out that the magnetrons that were stolen were for the outdated L-70 gun. The manner in which the theft was executed by cutting through the perimeter wire fence and breaking into the warehouse where the magnetrons were kept indicates a specificity of intention, of foreknowledge of the location of such equipment and thus the possibility that insiders were involved.

It also indicates that there was foreknowledge of whom the stolen equipment was to be handed to unlike in a random theft after which buyers are to be sought for the stolen property. Given the history of the theft of information from computers in the Naval war room by very senior personnel the many thefts and losses point to a malaise that is both dangerous and widespread in which personnel of many ranks are involved.

That is why, also, it is important to understand whether the steps taken to find the perpetrators was not deliberately sabotaged by the delay in filing the first information report (FIR) with the police. The oft-repeated assurance that the strictest action would be taken against the perpetrators is hardly reassuring if highly trained personnel are to be wasted away. It cannot be denied that it creates a hole in the command and control structure.

In the purely tactical context also the loss of the magnetrons if they were confined to the L-70 type of anti-aircraft guns means that a weapon system intended to be the last resort against an enemy attack with aircraft has been compromised. This last resort comes at the end of a multi-tiered network described generically as air defence ground environment system (ADGES) involving sensors (radars), missiles, anti-aircraft guns and dedicated interceptor aircraft.

It is often stated by military personnel themselves that there are gaps in the ADGES network that need to be filled up. An attempt to do this was made by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) by creating, in one of its few really laudable efforts, an indigenous radar system to detect aircraft and missiles (and possibly other flying objects like the UAV and RPV) that have managed to avoid the outer periphery of long-range radar and interceptors and have got into "the last resort” point in a vital installation or vital point as it is called in military terms. This radar is known as the INDRA radar.

It is because it is indigenous and not purchased from abroad where attempts to uncover its secret frequencies (as in the case of the imported L-70 guns) would have been more easily conducted abroad it should be also be within the ambit of the investigations whether the real target was the magnetrons used in the INDRA radar because that is something that could only be found in India because it was an indigenously developed equipment.

There are two types of INDRA radar one used by the Indian Air Force and the other by the Army. The one used by the Army is used by large mechanized infantry and armoured regiments to give to these strike formations an autonomous air defence system so as to be able to provide protection to this most potent force as it moves into enemy territory to fulfil strategic objectives like destroying enemy vital installations deep inside enemy territory and to hold ground so as to degrade enemy ability to continue the war.

Thus, the INDRA radar secrets would be the more precious secrets for an enemy rather than those of the L-70 gun. In the strategic context Pakistan has long been interested in knowing the kind of deployment that the Indian armed forces have laid out in the defence of Gujarat which in many ways is the gateway to the Indian economic heartland. Its occupation of a portion of the salty desert of the Rann of Kutch in 1965 as a prelude to launching the infiltrators into Jammu and Kashmir underscores the co-relation between its tactical and strategic aggressive intentions.

Not long ago the Indian Air Force shot down a Pakistan Air Force Atlanique aircraft which is used for maritime reconnaissance, that is, collection of information of all kinds—visual (photo images) and within the electro-magnetic spectrum like radio signals and radar emissions. It was suspected that the aircraft was gathering intelligence and it is no accidental coincidence that the area of its interest was the same as where the recent theft took place, Bhuj and Jamnagar, where vital components of the Indian air defence system are in place. Therefore, Pakistan’s keen interest in Indian defences in Gujarat plays an important part in its larger game plan to delink Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India.

The theft of the magnetrons is linked to that larger picture because this is part of electronic warfare intended to blind Indian defences before launching military operations at a point of its choosing. Electronic warfare is thus a complicated web of electronic measures of trying to acquire the signature of signals used by India to operate its radar network.

It is part of the archane game that there are ways to counter attempts to acquire electronic information which falls within the electronic counter measures (ECM) department. To be able to negate Indian counter-measures, Pakistan would need to employ electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM) and this is a war-game that goes on and on through frequency hopping, jamming, deception, etc. Theft of components is in this complicated milieu a short cut.

A magnetron would give Pakistan a clear idea of the frequencies within which the radar can be operated and it would be easy to develop counter measures to block the signals and thus blind the radar on which the missile and gun platforms depend to attack the incoming enemy. Indian intelligence services, both civil and military, need to devise foolproof ways and means by which they can pre-empt theft of secrets. It is not a capability that has been demonstrated with any confidence in recent times.


Courtesy : Syndicate Features

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