The jehadi and anti-India fervour in Pakistan was never really on the wane and as long as the country is ruled by the military and dictators it will never go. Not that civilian rulers can guarantee a change in this deep-rooted Pakistani policy. It has caused no surprise to anyone in India that militant camps have again become active in Pakistan. The Pakistanis have denied the existence of any terrorist camp on their soil—a routine charade played by Islamabad.

Somewhat surprisingly, official reaction in India to the news of fresh terrorist camps at Mansehar in Pakistan has been rather muted (as was the disclosure that the Pakistani Information Minister was once playing host to Indian militants), probably out of fear that a loud protest would wreck the peace process. On the other hand, the Afghans have been more vocal in complaining about the revival of militant training camps in Pakistan. It is significant that the US has not taken notice of the revival of militant camps in Pakistan and naturally Pakistan has done nothing to close these camps.

The India-Pakistan peace process, say many, also hinges on the fate of the Pakistani dictator, Gen Pervez Musharraf, who is finding himself pushed into a tight corner. The mullahs he had cultivated for survival in office have ostensibly turned against him and his quest for allies among the so-called secular parties has come a cropper. When the going gets tough for a Pakistani ruler the escape is provided by raising the anti-India pitch, sometimes by launching a war against India. The lisping Pakistani General may well be planning some tricks to replicate Kargil.

Musharraf, however, faces a problem of the scale that his military and civilian predecessors did not. His options of waging an open war against India are limited at the moment because all his oxygen supply—money, arms---comes from the US and his benefactors in Washington would not accept that he open a war front against India—or Afghanistan.

He is also handicapped by a malaise entirely of his own making—his deep distrust of most people around him, including the top military commanders who are supposed to be his solid’ supporters. To retain their loyalty the Musharraf dispensation has appointed a large number of serving and retired military officers on top civilian posts and allowed them to dip deep into the till.

Catering to the egos of the top military brass in the country, the Pakistani government has created quite a few four-star general (in India only the chief of the army staff is a four-star general). Since the Pakistani army functions on a kind of cronyism and Gen Musharraf being very much a part of the army, he has appointed a cousin as the core commander in Lahore, a top political hotspot in the country which plays a big role in the making and unmaking of Pakistani politicians.

Top Pakistani commanders are believed to have been denuded of many of their powers. That is entirely understandable considering that the previous military dictator, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, was almost paranoiac about his military commanders. It is said that everyday just after midnight Zia would telephone each of the top commanders to make sure that they were at home and not out hatching conspiracy against him. Anyone answering the phone on the first ring would arouse suspicion in Zia’s mind that the man may be busy plotting to throw him out. Because of the prevailing atmosphere of distrust and suspicion, a vigilante chain has been unofficially set up by Musharraf. If the governors keep an eye on provincial governments, the governor is watched by the military commander of the area and the commanders in turn are spied on by the ISI as well as the military intelligence.

Despite all this, dissatisfaction against the General remains within the Pakistani army, especially among the middle-level officers. It has been said by some Pakistani commentators that the next coup leader in Pakistan could well be a colonel rather than a general. But within the Pakistani army too a sort of unofficial vigilante system works with the generals and corps commanders, middle ranking officers and the jawans distrustful of each other. Sometime ago, a group of middle-ranking Pakistani army officers had written to the opposition parties that they should press for the trial of Gen Musharraf under article 6 of the constitution which caries the death penalty. Opposition leader, Javed Hashmi, who took up this matter, was awarded a 23-year prison sentence.

The attempts to strike a deal with Benazir Bhutto and her Pakistan People’s Conference (PPP) as well as Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) have failed. Both remain exiled. After receiving a snub from Begum Bhutto, Musharraf’s efforts at rapprochement with Sharif too seem to have failed as would be indicated by the fact that the Pakistani government has reneged on its alleged assurance to Sharif that he would be issued a passport should he apply for one from his exile in Saudi Arabia.

Notwithstanding his apparent growing unpopularity, Musharraf has started throwing hints that he will not only not give up his military post (chief of army staff) but would like to be president for another term after his present one expires in two years time.

Musharraf is optimistic enough to assume that he would first complete his present term before launching himself into another five-year term. His optimism need not generate a similar response in this country which will have to brace itself up for a long period of Pakistan’s duplicity: singing the peace tune in the open without actually giving up support to the vast jehadi-cum-militant apparatus it has created.


Courtesy : Syndicate Features

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