The tragedy of brutal killing of Maniappan Raman Kutty, a 36-year old driver with the Border Roads Organisation, working on an Indian-aided road project in Afghanistan by the Taliban last year has led to the injection of politics into that inhuman act against an Indian ‘soldier of peace’ in a foreign land. Given the sense of outrage, shock and horror that follows acts of terror and other inhuman acts against innocent civilians it is perhaps inevitable that the authorities become an instant target of public fury. While the political storm may peter out after a few days the shadows of certain foreign forces inimical to India that were clearly behind Kutty’s murder will not go away soon.
The most obvious of these dark elements is, of course, Pakistan which has given a mandate to its ISI to wage a permanent ‘war’ against the infidel India—regardless of the ostensibly contrary, pro-peace posture that Islamabad adopts for consumption in the West. Ever since the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan four years ago Pakistan has been unable to reconcile its loss of ‘strategic depth’ beyond Durand Line. Islamabad has been even more aghast at the prospect of India regaining its influence in Afghanistan and has been doing all it can to create obstacles for India as it reaches out to Afghanistan with a massive dose of help. Among these obstacles is Pakistan’s refusal to allow Indian goods to be transported to land-locked Afghanistan through Pakistani territory and raising ‘objections’ to India opening consulates in that country.
It is no secret that Pakistan is very unhappy to see India helping Afghanistan in any way. Islamabad has not liked India constructing a road in southern part of the country from Zaranj to Delaram that will provide an easy land access from Kabul to the Iranian port of Chah Bahar and reduce Pakistan’s importance for Afghanistan’s foreign trade. The completion of this road will also mean that Indian goods will be able to reach Afghanistan and then move on to Central Asia faster than ever before. There is danger that Afghanistan may shift most of its foreign trade to the Iranian port instead of Karachi.
While more light may be shed on Kutty’s murder as time progresses, there can be little doubt that the Taliban had abducted Kutty with the sole intention of killing him so as to send a ‘message’ to India on behalf of its ‘backer’ Pakistan that India should stay out of Afghanistan. This is also the ‘message’ that Pakistan had asked certain high American officials to convey to India. After kidnapping Kutty, his captors sent out only one communication, asking the Border Roads Organisation to leave Afghanistan within 48 hours. The BRO certainly does not ‘interfere’ in Afghan affairs, if that charge of the Taliban is to be taken into account. What the BRO is doing is something for the good of all Afghans, irrespective of their political ideology.
In most cases of kidnappings and abductions, the captors generally try to establish contact again to either repeat their demand or to fix another deadline. Here the ‘demand’ was that Indian government organisation winds up its establishment within 48 hours—by no means a practical or possible course, unless the BRO had decided to run away from Afghanistan. The BRO was not in a position to leave Afghanistan without the government of India first taking a major policy decision on its commitments for helping in the reconstruction of the Taliban-ravaged Afghanistan. The Taliban remained incommunicado for four days after announcing the abduction of Kutty.
Where the Indian government can be blamed is the short sightedness in not arranging adequate security for its personnel working in very insecure surroundings. But it is a moot point if India can provide security to its personnel by sending its own forces to Afghanistan. The only armed Indians posted in Afghanistan are the men who guard the Indian diplomatic mission there and they remain confined to the chancery. Americans will not allow India to send its troops, as all foreign troops in Afghanistan have to work under the overall American command. Surely, there will be yet another big political storm if India were to agree to send its personnel who have to take orders from American commanders.
The Americans may have thrown out the Taliban but much of Afghanistan continues to be unsafe for foreigners. The local security forces are not trained enough to give protection; maybe some of them are sympathetic to the Taliban which does have some influence among the ordinary Afghans in the western and eastern part of the country. President Hamid Karzai himself is guarded by the Americans.
In recent times, the Taliban has begun to re-emerge with some force. Till November last they had killed 120 foreign troops against 58 in the previous year and the civilian casualty figures had crossed 1500, the highest since the overthrow of the Taliban.
The Taliban resurgence has been possible with the aid of the Pakistani military establishment, particularly the ISI. But the Pakistani military establishment, presided over by Gen Pervez Musharraf, would not have achieved the success in revising the Taliban as also the India-bound Kashmiri terrorists but for America deciding to look the other way. Mullah Omar and his Taliban have stopped being a matter of worry for the US which is now concerned only with Al Qaeda and its chief, Osama bin Laden.
For nearly two years, the Afghan government has been complaining against the unchecked movement of the Taliban along its border with Pakistan. The Americans have done precious little to ask their clients in Islamabad to go after the Taliban (and Kashmiri terrorists) with the same zeal they have shown in rounding up those who were allegedly plotting to kill Musharraf or the Al Qaeda fugitives who threaten to attack America and American and other Western interests.
If reports in the Pakistani media are to be believed far from trying to see that the Taliban is contained the Americans are looking to strike a deal with these very people they (the Americans) had come to wipe out four years ago. This is because the US is now as desperate to pull its forces out of Afghanistan as it is in the more volatile Iraq.
The US seems to think that the law and order situation in Afghanistan can be brought under control quickly with the help of the so-called ‘moderate’ elements in the Taliban. Even Karzai is said to be not averse to cutting a deal with the Taliban, though qualifying that he is willing to do business with only the ‘moderate’ elements in the Taliban. The ‘moderate’ Taliban can turn into hardcore jehadis in due course and will be looking for more victims like M.R. Kutty from among the hundreds of Indians who are assisting Afghanistan to stand on its feet once again.
Courtesy : Syndicate Features
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