As the Indo-US ‘deal’ on civilian nuclear cooperation enters choppy waters of the US Congress to clear the last hurdle, efforts to abort it have been intensified expectedly in three quarters. First, there are the usual India-baiters and a powerful bipartisan US lobby that has renewed its nuclear non-proliferation pledges with evangelic zeal, having shed its great Rip Van ‘Wink (le)’ that had helped China defy its NPT obligations in assisting Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. Then, there is India’s constantly whining and irritable western neighbour that has redoubled its efforts to scuttle the nuclear ‘deal’ having failed to get from Uncle Sam, its guardian angel almost from the time of the birth of the new nation nearly six decades ago, a similar nuclear parcel.
A not too meek voice of protest against the nuclear ‘deal’ has also been heard in Beijing, but its damage potential must be lesser than the separate or united efforts of the other two quarters. The non-proliferation Ayatollahs in the US and the West working in tandem with the Pakistani lobbyists and the government is a distinct possibility which India has to encounter.
The three-legged effort against the nuclear ‘deal’ should, however, not have come as a surprise in India. The non-proliferation lobby had made its stand known against the deal from the beginning, rejecting all arguments advanced in favour of the treaty both in the US and India. China’s criticism is understandable because of the multi-level ‘competition’ it faces from India and the oft-repeated mention in the western media that the US wants to build up India as a counterpoise to China. It is the Pakistani efforts that India has to be wary of. In fact, it might be worthwhile considering a counter offensive against Pakistan should Islamabad decide to further raise the pitch of its petulant expostulations on the Indo-US nuclear ‘deal’.
India may have decided to ignore the shrill noises coming from Islamabad but the undercurrent of mischief –or the veiled threats--behind the Pakistani clamour should not be overlooked. Gen Pervez Musharraf, and his minions are crying hoarse that any agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the US will upset the ‘balance of power’ in South Asia. True to his bellicose style, Musharraf has already issued a warning about the ‘ill effects’ of the treaty. While using such words the Pakistani strongman reminds his home audience that he will do all he can to maintain the ‘edge’ over India weapons-wise.
Musharraf, otherwise fond of talking about ‘out of box’ approaches to thorny issues, does not like to accept that the ‘balance of power’ he talks about can be ‘upset’ even without US help to India. He cannot be unaware of the fact that Western intelligence sources are of the view that Pakistan has nearly as many bombs in its hidden basements as India even though it is India that faces two nuclear-armed, unfriendly neighbours. He does not want to think that India needs energy much more than the bomb. India’s energy hunger is at least four times more than that of Pakistan and its appetite for nuclear bomb considerably less than that of Pakistan.
In any case, Pakistan has lost no time in countering the Indo-US nuclear ‘deal’ by rushing to Beijing for a similar deal and given the past proliferation record of the two countries—and the acquiescence by the so-called non-proliferation champions of the world—it will be no surprise if the Beijing-Islamabad nuclear deal becomes a reality while the one between India and the US is bombed at the Capitol Hill.
The Pakistani protests could also serve two other sinister purposes. One, which is quite likely, is that if the American Congress gives its approval to the nuclear agreement with India, Pakistan will in due course be offered something similar. Two, the Pakistani objections are designed to influence US decision and policy makers most of whom want to bottle up Iran’s nuclear programme as they believe it is geared towards making the bomb. Tehran and some other capitals, including Pyongyang, joining the chorus against India will delight Islamabad.
While Pakistan is in a better position to boost its energy requirements from foreign sources—Iran and Central Asia—because of its geographical proximity to those regions, India has to depend on the ‘mercy’ of increasingly restive Pakistani tribesmen and a still unfriendly government in Islamabad—which continues to term India as an ‘enemy’-- if bigger supplies of oil or gas from the same sources have to reach India. Add to this the fact that oil and gas from Muslim countries is made available to Pakistan on easier terms than the ones offered to India. In other words, there should be a lesser urgency in Pakistan to start building nuclear power plants than in India.
Suspicion of Pakistani lobbies working, overtly or covertly with the American critics of the nuclear ‘deal’, arises when some influential Americans such as David Albright, a former IAEA inspector, give currency to imaginary stories, first fed by the Pakistanis, about India collaborating with Iran in the latter’s nuclear programme. A surreptitious nexus between certain US and Pakistan elements has recently come to light with the acknowledgement by the Pakistani foreign ministry before that country’s auditors that it had influenced—through bribes?-- some members of the 9/11 commission in the US not to highlight the Pakistani links in that terror attack on US soil. The ‘balance of power’ theory, another Pakistani patent, is also being echoed on the Capitol Hill.
Critics who say that the US amending its laws to ‘favour’ India will mark the ‘death’ of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty are the people who want to preserve in perpetuity the ‘have’ status of the five ‘recognised’ nuclear states. Relations among these five ‘haves’ are nowhere as distrustful and uneasy as they were among some of them during the Cold War and yet each of them possesses nuclear bombs in thousands. The non-proliferation Ayatollahs in the US have lent their open or tacit support to the refusal of their government to renounce (as India has) the policy of ‘first use’ or pre-emptive nuclear strike even against non-nuclear states but they want all the other countries to abjure the use of nuclear weapons or even keep them as a deterrent.
Clearly, New Delhi will have to get ready for a long hard battle with its traditional baiters, irrespective of the eventual fate of the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement. If it fails to take off in the US Congress, the government may have to review its policy towards the US and find ways of outliving the backlash of anger in the country.
If the ‘deal’ does get the final US nod, as it appears likely because of the efforts of President Bush and Secretary of State Rice, the government here will have to watch out for any harm that embittered and frustrated unfriendly powers might like to cause. This could come in any shape such as efforts to drive a wedge between New Delhi and Washington and/or creating misunderstanding with other nations aspiring to expand their nuclear programmes.
Courtesy : Syndicate Features
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