THE KASHMIR DIALOGUE
G. PARTHASARATHY
Columnist and former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

On October 25, 2004, General Pervez Musharraf 'floated' some 'new ideas' for moving ahead on the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) issue in the ongoing dialogue process between India and Pakistan. He called for 'identifying' seven distinct regions in J&K on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC). Two regions that he alluded to are Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the Northern Areas now under Pakistani control. The remaining five regions on the Indian side he was alluding to appear to include the Jammu Region (Hindu majority), the Poonch Region and the Valley of Kashmir (Sunni Muslim dominated), the Kargil Sector (Shia Muslim dominated) and the Ladakh Region (Buddhist majority). General Musharraf spoke of 'demilitarizing' these regions. He added that they should either be granted 'independence', placed under 'Joint Indo-Pakistan control,' or under 'UN Mandate'. Faced with criticism in Pakistan for not insisting on UN Resolutions, he hastened to clarify that all he had done was to float a few trial balloons.

The Manmohan Singh Government in New Delhi was placed in an awkward situation by General Musharraf's 'loud thinking'. Musharraf's proposals were very close to those put forward a few years earlier by the Washington based Kashmir Study Group headed by Kashmiri business tycoon Farookh Katwari, who was encouraged by the Clinton Administration in his efforts. Katwari's proposals sought to divide J&K on religious lines and to secure a semi-independent status for the Kashmir Valley. There were few takers for these suggestions in New Delhi. Sensing that he had no option but to respond to General Musharraf's 'trial balloons', Prime Minister Manmohan Singh set out India's position in unambiguous terms when visiting Srinagar on November 17, 2004. Dr. Singh asserted: "I have made it quite clear that any redrawing of the international border is something which is not going to be acceptable to us… Any proposal which smacks of a further division of our country on the basis of religion is not going to be acceptable to us… Within these two limits we are ready to look into any new proposals".

While the Pakistan Foreign Office predictably termed Dr. Manmohan Singh's response as disappointing and repeatedly kept urging 'flexibility', the presently unbridgeable gap between India's bottom line on the issue of J&K and Pakistan's expectations came into clear focus. It is obvious that no amount of diplomatic sophistry can bridge the vast divide between the two countries on what Pakistan calls the 'core issue'. Any possibility of a 'solution' to the Kashmir issue in the foreseeable future can thus be ruled out. The question that arises is how the two countries can evolve a framework which enables them to live with these differences, while demonstrating that tensions are being reduced and that ordinary Kashmiris are proceeding with their lives with safety, dignity and economic progress. Pakistan can derive some satisfaction from the fact that it has got New Delhi to discuss issues pertaining to J&K in a sustained manner thirty two years after the Simla Agreement was signed. New Delhi, in turn, can now be satisfied with the fact that this dialogue is taking place after a public pledge by General Musharraf that he would not allow territory under Pakistan's control to be used for terrorist activities against India. Pakistan also realizes that its quest for third party mediation has reached a dead end in world capitals that matter - Washington, Moscow, London, Paris and Beijing.

There now appears to be some recognition in Islamabad that while it must keep harping on words like 'core issue' and 'solution' while referring to J&K, what it can practically hope to achieve for the present is an unfreezing of the status quo in J&K, while simultaneously discussing a wide range of issues to reduce tensions and enhance confidence between the two countries. Given the predominance of the Army establishment in determining policies towards India, even a rational economic thinker like Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has no option but to place a long list of conditions to normalization of trade and economic relations. But Shaukat Aziz has indicated that such relations could expand as negotiations for a South Asian Free Trade Area (scheduled to be launched in January 2006) pick up momentum. One hopes that credible security guarantees will be obtained from Iran before the gas pipeline project through Pakistan is finally inked. This project can move ahead once the prices are agreed upon and India completes arrangements for alternate modes of transportation, should supplies be cut.

A wide range of issues have been discussed under the 'Composite Dialogue Process' between India and Pakistan in recent months. The Foreign Secretaries of the two countries have met twice. Foreign Minister Kasuri has visited India and External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh was in Pakistan last month. Despite these meetings, differences remain over hydroelectric projects like Baglihar and Kishenganga in J&K, with Pakistan either seeking World Bank intervention where its demands are not met, or stalling a mutually acceptable solution, as in the Tulbul Navigation project, despite India stopping construction work in deference to Pakistani demands in 1988. While there has been an inclination on both sides to remain inflexible on many issues, the most notable achievement has been the agreement to establish a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad last month. There is also to be a bus service between Amritsar and Lahore and for the first time in 30 years Pakistan has agreed to reopen the rail link between Munabao in Rajasthan and Khokrapar in Sind. A human dimension is now being given to the relationship with politicians, judges, lawyers, professionals and business men traveling across the border. But these measures can be best implemented only if the existing visa regime is liberalized and Consulates to issue visas are reopened in Karachi and Mumbai.

At the strategic military level, the pace of normalization has been could have been faster. The two countries agreed during the Lahore Summit in February 1999 to conclude agreements for prior notification of missile tests and to avoid incidents at sea. These agreements are yet to be concluded. Contacts between the Directors General of Military Operations and the Foreign Secretaries are being upgraded. Mutual confidence could be further enhanced if there are direct links between the Air Operations Directorates of the two Air Forces. Further while India has spelt out its nuclear doctrine to Pakistan, there has been no reciprocity on this score. It is evident that Pakistan wishes to maintain a posture of ambiguity on its nuclear doctrine in order to constantly hold out the threat of Kashmir being a 'nuclear flashpoint' to the international community, though this threat carries little credibility presently. New Delhi recognizes that while the Pakistani nuclear deterrent is 'India specific', Pakistan is not going to get into a suicide mode of using nuclear weapons unless its very survival is at stake.

There are still a number of areas where cooperation, confidence and contacts between India and Pakistan can be expanded. India should ensure that a large number of tourists from Pakistan are welcomed in J&K throughout the tourist season. Srinagar should be expeditiously made into an international airport. Bus routes between Kargil and Skardu and Jammu and Sialkot are other measures that can be taken soon. Moves need also to be initiated for free trade across the LoC. But amidst interest in such measures a degree of caution needs to be injected. Because of threats posed to American interests and his own security, General Musharraf has curbed the activities of two ISI supported Pakistani groups, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in J&K. But other groups like the Lashkar e Taiba continue to operate with support from the ISI. While overall casualties and infiltration levels have gone down, Pakistan based terrorist groups are now pointedly targeting vulnerable security forces installations, Government offices and politicians who do not toe Islamabad's line in Jammu and Kashmir. The infrastructure for promoting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir still remains intact. Pakistan is also arming and training insurgent groups operating in India's northeast with active cooperation from the Khaleda Zia Government in Bangladesh.

New Delhi appears to believe that it can and should move ahead on the process of normalization even if General Musharraf does not fully keep the promise he made on January 6, 2004, to end all support for terrorism on Pakistan controlled territory. It, however, remains to be seen how the military establishment in Pakistan acts in coming months on its policies of wanting to 'weaken India from within' and 'bleeding India with a thousand cuts'. The picture will become clearer when the winter snows melt in the Himalayas.