|
|
Kashmir: Pakistan Explores a
Political End-Game
Praveen Swami
Special Correspondent, Frontline
For years, Pakistan
hasn't needed a political end-game on Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Its
state-run jihad, most military and intelligence analysts in
Pakistan assumed, would eventually wear India down and force it to make
significant territorial concessions. Now, however, Pakistan has been
pushed into reining back the jihad on which its entire strategy
in J&K was founded. This winter has been the most peaceful in years -
and Pakistan is now discovering that it needs the kind of legitimacy
commanded by politicians, not the Kalashnikov. Using the
Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM)
as its sheep dog, Pakistan is attempting to corral a profoundly unruly
flock. The lambs, apparently, have grown both spines and brains - and
until the dog actually demonstrates the ability to bite, seem unlikely
to fall in line.
At least some elements of Pakistan's new political strategy can now be
discerned. In the build-up to the ongoing South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in Islamabad, a three-pronged effort
was made to deny India political space in J&K. First, Pakistan brought
intense pressure to bear on the Jamaat-e-Islami to back hardline
Islamist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who split the All Parties
Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
last year to set up a parallel secessionist organisation. Second, its
intelligence services sought to persuade the centrist APHC to back out
of dialogue with India, which many observers believe will commence in
the coming weeks. Finally, efforts were made to recruit the services of
secessionist politicians outside the APHC fold, notably Shabbir Shah, to
strengthen the rejectionist APHC faction.
None of these enterprises have met with any success. In early December
2003, Ashraf Sehrai, the Jamaat-e-Islami's Naib Amir, or deputy
chief, launched a new initiative to secure the organisation's backing
for Geelani. Sehrai plainly had Pakistan's backing. On November 13,
2003, speaking at a dinner hosted by Pakistan's High Commissioner to New
Delhi, Aziz Ahmad Khan, Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid
Ahmad said that his country recognised "only the Hurriyat led by Geelani
and no one else." "After all," he continued, "Geelani's group has been
recognised by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference." The leaders
of the centrist APHC, he said somewhat cryptically, were simply
"Kashmiri leaders." Soon afterwards, Ghulam Rasool Dar, a member of the
Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin's command council, better known by his nom de
guerre Riaz Rasool, visited top Jamaat-e-Islami leaders with a
message from the organisation's supreme commander, Mohammad Yusuf Shah @
Syed Salahuddin.
Sehrai's efforts to get Jamaat-e-Islami backing for the rejectionist
APHC met with a sharp rebuke. The Naib Amir's declaration of
support for Geelani led to a public put-down from his organisation.
Zahid Ali, the Jamaat-e-Islami's spokesperson, let it be known that
Sehrai did not have the party's backing, and was "not in favour of
toeing somebody's line." Ali went on to charge Sehrai with failing to
promote the Jamaat-e-Islami's interests. Soon after, on December 27,
2003, Syed Nazir Ahmad Kashani, the Amir-e-Jamaat, or
Jamaat-e-Islami supreme chief, used his executive powers to sack Sehrai.
This, however, provoked a sharp response from Geelani backers within the
APHC, and on December 29, Kashani was compelled to summon a meeting of
the Jamaat-e-Islami's Markazi Majlis-e-Shoora, or central
council, its highest decision-making body.
On January 1, the Jamaat-e-Islami announced its final position on the
APHC. The Jamaat-e-Islami made clear it did not support Maulvi Abbas
Ansari, the Shia cleric who heads the centrist faction of the APHC. Ali
noted, in particular, that the "manner in which Ansari had been elected
chairman was unacceptable to us." This was of a piece with several past
Jamaat-e-Islami pronouncements on the centrist APHC, many of whose
members detest Ansari simply because of his Shia religious affiliations.
To placate these hardliners, Kashani part-reinstated Sehrai as the head
of the Jamaat-e-Islami's political wing. At the same time, however, the
Markazi Majlis-e-Shoora made clear it would not back Geelani "for
the time being," and called for either the implementation of United
Nations resolutions on J&K, or a three-way dialogue between India,
Pakistan and representatives of the State's people. Finally, the
Jamaat-e-Islami committed itself to continue its "democratic and
constitutional struggle" - a signal indication of its willingness to
operate within the four corners of the Indian political system.
If this would have done little to cheer Inter-Services Intelligence
strategists in Islamabad, their efforts to bring the centrists
themselves in line did little better. Like the Jamaat-e-Islami
moderates, key centrists, notably Srinagar religious leader Mirwaiz
Mohammad Farooq, are believed to have been 'leaned on' by the
Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin. Members of Pakistan-based Shia organisations
affiliated to Ansari are also believed to have been subjected to
considerable arm-twisting. If the intention of the enterprise was indeed
to sabotage the planned dialogue with India, it failed. A draft
invitation for the Hurriyat centrists to go to New Delhi, source say,
has been prepared, and should be issued in coming weeks. The centrists
are likely to accept the invitation, a brief missive that contains no
pre-defined terms of reference or conditions for the talks. "No one,"
Indian intelligence sources told this writer, "expects rapid results;
the idea is to start talking, and let things take their time."
Finally, efforts by Islamabad to get Geelani the backing of minor
secessionist figures have also gone nowhere. Shabbir Shah was asked to
mediate a compromise between both APHC factions, which would give
Geelani greater leverage. Sources indicate that Shah dithered for
several weeks, pointing to the fact that the Kashmir Bar Association (KBA)
was attempting to secure a rapprochement. The dithering served its
purpose, since the KBA's efforts led to nothing, and Shah managed to
keep out of the imbroglio. Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
leader Yasin Malik, for his part, has kept a studied distance from the
centrists, but has stopped short of announcing support for Geelani. As
things stand, Geelani has the support of several minor Islamist leaders,
all of whom would have trouble winning municipality elections, let alone
have a credible chance of building a valley-wide mass base.
What does all this point to? The fact is that Pakistan's sheep-dogs
have, for a variety of reasons, been muzzled. Jihadi ranks within
J&K have been depleted by ongoing Indian military operations, and a
sharp reduction in cross-border infiltration has meant that there has
been no replenishment. Come this spring, Pakistan will have to decide
whether it wants to let go its jihad, or once again remove the
muzzles. That decision will, most certainly, shape the course of
political life in J&K over the months and years to come.
Courtesy:
South Asia Terrorism Portal |
Email this page
to a friend
Printer-Friendly Page
